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Advisory Opinions and the Problem of 
Legal Authority 
Christian R. Burset* 
The prohibition against advisory opinions is fundamental to our 
understanding of federal judicial power, but we have misunderstood its origins. 
Discussions of the doctrine begin not with a constitutional text or even a court 
case, but a letter in which the Jay Court rejected President Washington's request 
for legal advice. Courts and scholars have offered a variety of explanations for 
the Jay Court's behavior. But they all depict the earliest Justices as responding 
to uniquely American concerns about advisory opinions. 
This Article offers a different explanation. Drawing on previously 
untapped archival sources, it shows that judges throughout the anglophone 
world-not only in the United States but also in England and British India-
became opposed to advisory opinions in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. The death of advisory opinions was a global phenomenon, rooted in a 
period of anxiety about common-law authority. 
Early modern English judges had routinely advised the Crown. This 
advisory role was politically fraught but doctrinally unproblematic thanks to a 
jurisprudential orthodoxy that treated judges' opinions as evidence of a 
preexisting common law. Although this declaratory theory survived into the 
nineteenth century (and beyond), it began to fragment after 1750, as lawyers 
began to disagree about the nature of precedent. Those disagreements generated 
new pressure to clarify the weight of different kinds of legal authority. Most 
lawyers intuited that advisory opinions were less authoritative than decisions 
arising from litigation. But because bench and bar lacked a common theory of 
legal authority, they were unable to articulate a shared understanding of what 
respect was due to judges' extrajudicial pronouncements. As a result, advisory 
opinions became dangerous, because the judges who issued them could not 
* Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School. For their questions and comments at 
various stages of this project, the author thanks Akhil Amar, Will Baude, A.J. Bellia, Sadie 
Blanchard, Ben Brady, Sam Bray, Chris Casey, Bill Casto, Christine Chabot, Patrick Corrigan, 
Barry Cushman, Maria Macia, Gregory Mark, Marah McLeod, Zvi Rosen, Max Stearns, Jay 
Tidmarsh, Chas Tyler, David Waddilove, and Lael Weinberger. This Article also benefited from 
feedback at the Notre Dame Law School faculty workshop and the Chicagoland Junior 
Scholars Conference. Sophia Aguilar, Natalie Fulk, Thomas Hellenbrand, David Spicer, and 
Nikolai Stieglitz provided helpful research assistance. Brandy Ellis of the Kresge Law Library 
masterfully connected me with crucial sources under uniquely challenging conditions. 
621 
622 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3:621 
control how future readers might treat them. In response, judges sought to limit 
their advisory activity-first in England, then in British-controlled Bengal, and 
finally in the United States, whose judges inherited Britain's contested and 
dynamic understanding of the judicial role. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rule against advisory opinions has been described as "the 
oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability,"1 
but its pedigree is doubtful. Discussions of the doctrine begin not with 
the Constitution's text or even a landmark case, but a four-sentence 
letter from 1793 in which the Jay Court rejected the Washington 
Administration's request for advice on questions of international law. 2 
1. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (quoting CHARLES WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 34 
(1963)); accord RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 52 (7th ed. 
2015); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues''.· Rethinking the Judicial Function, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1844 (2001). 
2. Letter from U.S. Sup. Ct. JJ. to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 5 THE SELECTED 
PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 545, 545 (Elizabeth M. Nuxoll ed., 2017) [hereinafter JAY PAPERS]. 
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Courts and commentators have conventionally read that letter as 
declaring advisory opinions to be unconstitutional, 3 but some scholars 
have questioned that understanding.4 The Constitution never mentions 
advisory opinions, which English judges had routinely issued. 
Therefore, the revisionists argue, the Jay Court's refusal to provide the 
requested opinions reflected prudential or political concerns, not 
constitutional ones. 5 
These accounts offer starkly different interpretations of what 
has become known as the Correspondence of the Justices. But they agree 
in treating the Jay Court's letter as a uniquely American event that 
responded to distinctively American concerns. This Article disagrees. 
Drawing on previously untapped archival sources, it shows that judges 
throughout the common-law world-not only in the United States but 
also in Britain and its empire-turned against advisory opinions during 
the second half of the eighteenth century. The demise of advisory 
opinions was a global phenomenon that requires a transnational 
explanation. This Article supplies one. 
During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, judges 
routinely provided legal advice to the Crown. This advisory role was 
politically fraught but doctrinally unproblematic thanks to a 
jurisprudential orthodoxy that treated judges' opinions as evidence of a 
preexisting law. 6 Although this declaratory conception of the law 
survived into the nineteenth century (and beyond), it began to fragment 
shortly before the American Revolution, as judges and lawyers started 
to disagree in subtle ways about the nature of precedent. Those 
disagreements generated new pressure to clarify the weight of different 
kinds of legal authority. Lawyers intuited that advisory opinions were 
less authoritative than opinions accompanying judgments. But because 
bench and bar lacked a common theory of legal authority, they were 
unable to articulate a shared understanding of exactly what respect was 
due to judges' extrajudicial pronouncements. As a result, judges began 
to worry that readers might invest advisory opinions with the wrong 
3. See, e.g., Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 176 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 781 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 302 (2004); Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 191-92 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (per curiam); Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 
337 U.S. 582, 647-48 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 
354 (1911); United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 301 (1909); infra Section III.C. 
4. For overviews of the literature, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME 
COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 12-14 (1985); and FALLON ET AL., supra note 1, 
at 52-53. 
5. See infra Sections IV.Band IV.C (discussing scholarly views on the rationale for the Jay 
Court's refusal to provide advisory opinions). 
6. See infra Part II. 
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kind of authority. In response, judges sought to limit their advisory 
activity-first in England, then in British-controlled Bengal, and finally 
in the United States, whose judges inherited Britain's contested and 
dynamic understanding of the judiciary. 7 
This Article begins with an overview of current scholarship (Part 
I). It then gives a narrative history of the advisory role of early modern 
English judges, during what some scholars have termed the "classical" 
era of the common law (Part ID. Although judges had a duty to provide 
the Crown with legal advice, they also worried that their role as royal 
advisors might compromise their duty to declare the law impartially. In 
response, they developed procedural norms meant to reconcile their 
judicial and advisory roles. 
Part III turns to the second half of the eighteenth century, when 
judges stopped or tried to stop giving advisory opinions. It begins with 
Sackville's Case (1760), which is generally considered the last advisory 
opinion given to the Crown by English judges. 8 Although legal 
historians and constitutional lawyers have long looked to that case to 
illuminate the American approach to advisory opinions, 9 this Article 
offers a new interpretation that challenges the prevailing theory of why 
English judges curtailed their advisory activity. The story then moves 
to Calcutta, which served as the capital of Britain's emerging empire in 
South Asia. Starting in 1775, that city was home to a royally chartered 
Supreme Court of Judicature ("SCJ"). Although the SCJ departed from 
English practice in many respects, its justices understood their role as 
analogous to that of English judges.10 The SCJ's first chief justice, Sir 
Elijah Impey, had been a respected litigator and municipal judge in 
England. 11 Sir Robert Chambers, one of the SCJ's first puisne justices, 
had succeeded Sir William Blackstone as the Vinerian Professor at 
Oxford. 12 The other two justices had each been a barrister in England 
for more than a decade. 13 These men expressly tried to emulate English 
7. See infra Part III. 
8. But cf. infra Appendix (noting a possible exception). 
9. See, e.g., 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 214 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987); see also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 29 n.11 (1955) (Reed, J., 
dissenting) ("[T]he case could hardly have escaped the notice of the members of the 
Constitutional Convention."). 
10. See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 281-90 (2010). 
11. B.N. PANDEY, THE INTRODUCTION OF ENGLISH LAW INTO INDIA: THE CAREER OF ELIJAH 
IMPEY IN BENGAL, 1774-1783, at 39-40 (1967); T.H. Bowyer, lmpey, Sir Elijah (1732-1809), in 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison eds., 2004) 
[hereinafter DNB]. 
12. THOMAS M. CURLEY, SIR ROBERT CHAMBERS: LAW, LITERATURE, AND EMPIRE IN THE AGE 
OF JOHNSON 69 (1998). 
13. PANDEY, supra note 11, at 38-39. 
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practice concerning advisory opinions.14 The value of studying their 
behavior is not that it directly influenced American views but that it 
offers a rare opportunity to study eighteenth-century conceptions of 
judicial power in the context of a newly created court. Part III concludes 
by briefly retelling the better-known actions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1793. 
Part IV uses this historical narrative to reevaluate existing 
explanations for the Correspondence. Although each of those theories is 
partly correct, they cannot account for the decline of advisory opinions 
as a global phenomenon. Part V proposes an explanation that can. It 
argues that the demise of advisory opinions reflected a crisis of 
common-law authority. The Part begins by describing that crisis, before 
using it to explain judges' behavior in England, British-controlled 
Bengal, and the United States. In all three jurisdictions, judges avoided 
or tried to avoid giving advisory opinions in response to growing 
concerns about their being treated as excessively authoritative. 
The Conclusion explores some implications of this historical 
argument. We shouldn't expect federal courts to start issuing advisory 
opinions any time soon. Although they would have been permitted at 
the Founding, they were always optional; and courts' consistent 
practice of rejecting them merits respect. 15 Indeed, one contribution of 
this Article is not to destabilize current practices but to make sense of 
doctrines that now seem conceptually incoherent. For example, some 
scholars have argued that the Supreme Court's justiciability doctrines 
fit uneasily with its practical focus on expounding the Constitution. 16 
Why worry about whether a case is moot, for example, when the case is 
only a vehicle for declaring constitutional law? But that tension 
14. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. For example, Justice Stephen Caesar 
Lemaistre defended his refusal to give one advisory opinion by citing the conduct of English judges 
in cases involving general warrants. Letter from J. Stephen Caesar Lemaistre to Warren Hastings 
(Nov. 22, 1776), Add. Ms. 29137, at 476, 479v-480r (on file with the British Library). He explained 
that although those judges condemned the practice when its legality was challenged in litigation, 
they "never wantonly and extrajudicially took up that question of their own accord." Id. 
15. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1816-17 (2015) (arguing that even if advisory opinions 
would have been permitted at the Founding, subsequent historical practice has created a 
constitutional rule against them); John F. Manning, The Necessary and Proper Clause and Its 
Legal Antecedents, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1349, 1376 (2012) (reviewing GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. 
MlLLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER 
CLAUSE (2010)) ("[T]hough it was unobvious at the outset whether Article III courts could properly 
issue advisory opinions, a practical construction of Article III gave rise to a decisive constitutional 
prohibition against that practice."); Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive 
and Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 WM. & MARYL. REV. 
535, 554-55 (2016) (describing the prohibition on judicial issuance of advisory opinions as a 
historical practice that has hardened into a constitutional rule). 
16. See infra note 344 and accompanying text. 
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evaporates when one realizes that the Court's avoidance of advisory 
opinions-the root of all justiciability doctrines-was actually an effort 
to avoid misleading declarations oflaw. Justiciability doctrines do not 
just constrain the Court's law-declaration function; they also protect it. 
The Conclusion also highlights a methodological intervention. 
Historically minded scholars of federal courts have often traced the 
narrow path running from England to the early United States. 
Expanding the scope of inquiry to include other common-law 
jurisdictions, including British India, allows us to consider new 
evidence that might shed light on otherwise intractable problems. 
* * * 
Before continuing, it might be helpful to clarify a crucial term. 
This Article defines advisory opinion as a legal opinion delivered by one 
or more judges in their official capacities but outside of the ordinary 
process of litigation.17 Traditionally, advisory opinions were issued by 
judges, not by courts. 18 (In England, advisory opinions were typically 
issued by the twelve judges of the superior courts of common law-
King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer.19) Accordingly, advisory 
opinions did not invoke a court's power to issue a binding judgment.20 
This definition excludes some practices that are sometimes 
lumped with advisory opinions. First, it excludes advice that judges 
give in private. That reflects a distinction that judges themselves 
have historically drawn.21 Talking about the law behind closed 
17. For other possible definitions, see Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: 
The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 643-51 (1992). 
18. Today, three states have provisions that describe courts, rather than their justices, as 
advice-givers. These provisions were enacted in 1886 (Colorado), 1889 (South Dakota), and 1962 
(Michigan). MEL A. TOPF, A DOUBTFUL AND PERILOUS EXPERIMENT: ADVISORY OPINIONS, STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, at xiv-xv, 21-25 (2011). 
19. See infra Part II. 
20. See infra notes 210-211 and accompanying text; see also Letter from John Jay, Sup. Ct., 
C.J., to James Iredell, Sup. Ct., J. (Sept. 15, 1790), in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES 
IREDELL 292, 294 (Griffith John McRee ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857) (draft ofletter from 
U.S. Sup. Ct. JJ. to George Washington, referring to "the distinction between a Court and 
its Judges"). 
21. See Maeva Marcus, Separation of Powers in the Early National Period, 30 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 269, 273 (1989) (noting that the Supreme Court has historically distinguished advisory 
opinions by the Court as an institution from the giving of advice by Justices on an individual basis). 
For instance, Chief Justice Jay had no objection to offering legal advice in private letters to 
President Washington, even though he declined to join a public letter in 1793. See, e.g., Letter from 
John Jay to George Washington (Aug. 28, 1790), in 5 JAY PAPERS, supra note 2, at 270. Justice 
Frankfurter, who campaigned against advisory opinions as a professor and as a Justice, see infra 
Part I, nonetheless gave frequent advice to the Roosevelt Administration. William R. Casto, 
Advising Presidents: Robert Jackson and the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 
80 (2012). English judges also observed this distinction. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Dundas, Home 
2021] ADVISORY OPINIONS & LEGAL AUTHORITY 627 
doors might raise ethical issues, but it has not usually raised 
constitutional concerns.22 
Second, my definition excludes certified questions-questions of 
law on which one court seeks guidance from another court or its judges. 
Again, this distinction reflects historical practice. English judges 
regularly advised other courts, even after they stopped giving advisory 
opinions to the Crown. 23 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has been 
authorized to answer certified questions from circuit courts since 
1802, a practice that never seems to have triggered concerns about 
Article III. 24 
Finally, my definition excludes advisory activity that functioned 
as appellate review. This includes, for example, advice to the Crown 
about the legality of court-martial verdicts, which persisted into the 
nineteenth century.25 Although those opm10ns were technically 
extrajudicial, they effectively served as appeals from judgments that 
would otherwise have been unreviewable in common-law courts.26 
Sec'y, to Lord Loughborough, C.J. of Common Pleas (Sept. 12, 1792), GD51/l/20/3, Melville Papers 
(on file with National Records of Scotland) (describing a request for an opinion as "personally to 
yourself," when there had been "no formal Reference to the Judges"). 
22. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and 
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 36 (1998) ("[T)here is no formal constitutional prohibition on federal 
judges giving advice pertaining to legal matters ... .'). 
23. See, e.g., Sutton v. Johnstone (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1215; 1 Term. Rep. 493 (reporting advice 
from the chief justices of Common Pleas and King's Bench to the Lord Chancellor in his capacity 
as judge of Exchequer Chamber); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452-53 (discussing 
the practice ofreferring cases from Chancery to judges of King's Bench or Common Pleas to obtain 
their opinions on questions oflaw ); J.H. Baker, Ascertainment of Foreign Law: Certification to and 
by English Courts Prior to 1861, 28 INT'L & COMPAR. L.Q. 141 (1979); Stewart Jay, Servants of 
Monarchs and Lords: The Advisory Role of Early English Judges, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 193 
(1994) (discussing judges' advice to the House of Lords). 
24. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 6, 2 Stat. 156, 159; see, e.g., G. Edward White, The Working 
Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1984) (describing the Marshall 
Court's enthusiasm for certification). The practice quietly died in the twentieth century. See Aaron 
Nielson, The Death of the Supreme Court's Certified Question Jurisdiction, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 
483, 484-85 (2010). 
25. See James Oldham, Informal Lawmaking in England by the Twelve Judges in the Late 
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 181, 189 & n.35 (2011); see also 
JOHNNOORTHOUCK, ANEW HISTORY OF LoNDON, INCLUDING WESTMINSTER AND SOUTHWARK 471-
74 (London, R. Baldwin 1773) (describing an opinion given in 1769 about the wording of a death 
warrant); Chantal Stebbings, The Appeal By Way of Case Stated from the Determinations of 
General Commissioners of Income Tax: An Historical Perspective, 1996 BRIT. TAX REV. 611, 612-
13 (describing the "case stated" procedure used to review tax-commission decisions). 
26. Court-martial sentences had to be approved by the king, who had discretion to abrogate 
them for any reason. See CHARLES JAMES, A COLLECTION OF THE CHARGES, OPINIONS, AND 
SENTENCES OF GENERAL COURTS MARTIAL, at x & n.* (London, T. Egerton 1820). By the late 
eighteenth century, he typically followed the advice of his judges or law officers when considering 
challenges to sentences' legality. See id. (describing an instance in which the king abrogated a 
court-martial sentence based on the advice of the twelve judges). Commentators sometimes 
described this process as an appeal. See JOHN DELAFONS, A TREATISE ON NAVAL COURTS MARTIAL 
290 (London, P. Steel 1805). There was even some suggestion that such an appeal was of right in 
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These exclusions might strike you as gerrymandered, but their 
coherence will become clear as the Article unfolds. For now, it's enough 
to note that all three categories dodged the problem that afflicted true 
advisory opinions: the problem of uncertain legal authority. 27 
I. EXPLAINING THE CORRESPONDENCE 
This Article builds on a rich body of scholarship, and it might be 
helpful to begin by laying out the current state of play. Until now, there 
have been three main theories about the Jay Court's actions in 1793: 
that the Constitution forbids advisory opm10ns; that the 
Correspondence was a prudential effort to advance certain policy aims, 
such as augmenting the credibility of the United States in foreign 
affairs; or that the Justices wanted to avoid giving an opinion that 
would politically hurt the Court or its members. 
The orthodox story, reflected in Supreme Court doctrine, is that 
advisory opinions would violate "the separation of powers prescribed by 
the Constitution."28 Many scholars have agreed. Then-professor Felix 
Frankfurter wrote in 1930 that the Justices must have determined that 
"the giving of such opinions would not be a proper exercise of the 
'judicial power'" conferred by Article III.29 Later commentators have 
elaborated on that reading. 30 Extrajudicial advice is, as the name 
suggests, extrajudicial, in the sense of reaching beyond judges' 
proper role. 31 
capital cases. See John Scott [later Lord Chancellor Eldon], Opinion of the Solicitor General (Oct. 
18, 1792), in 1 JOHN MCARTHUR, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF NAVAL AND MILITARY COURTS 
MARTIAL 434, 435 (London, J. Butterworth 2d ed. 1805) ("I think the prisoner might reasonably be 
thought entitled to have the opinion of his Majesty's judges .... [l]n a case affecting the life of the 
subject, it is usual to give the subject the protection which he can find only in their wisdom .... "). 
On the obstacles to direct review of court-martial verdicts, see Richard D. Rosen, Civilian Courts 
and the Military Justice System: Collateral Review of Courts-Martial, 108 MIL. L. REV. 5, 
14-18 (1985). 
27. See infra note 311. 
28. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968). 
29. Felix Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions, National, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 475, 476 (Edwin R.A. Seligman ed., 1930); see also Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, 
Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 527, 543-44 (describing 
Justice Frankfurter's enthusiasm for the case-or-controversy requirement). 
30. E.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any "Dear John" Letters: 
Advisory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473,478 (1998) (reviewing STEWART JAY, 
MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES (1997)); see also James E. 
Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early Republic, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 41 (2008) (accepting the separation-of-powers story, but adding that "workload 
and compensation concerns may have strengthened the Justices' resolve"). 
31. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 700 (1997) ("[T]he judicial power to decide cases 
and controversies does not include the provision of purely advisory opinions .... "); Note, Advisory 
Opinions and the Influence of the Supreme Court over American Policymaking, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
2064, 2064 (2011) (summarizing this view). 
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Although that doctrinal account remains dominant in the courts, 
recent historiography has been skeptical of it. One alternative 
explanation has focused on the practical disadvantages of advisory 
opinions. Here, too, the trail starts with Professor Frankfurter. 
Although he framed advisory opinions as constitutionally forbidden, he 
also defended the Correspondence as helping to ensure "legislative and 
popular responsibility" for policymaking.32 Moreover, he argued, 
advisory opinions led to worse decisions by forcing judges to consider 
legislation outside of its real-life context.33 
Frankfurter did not connect this policy argument to the Justices' 
concerns in 1 793, but more recent scholarship has offered a historically 
grounded approach that focuses on the specific questions the 
Washington Administration wanted to ask. The issue in 1793 was not 
whether the Justices would issue an opinion but whether they would 
issue an opinion about the law of nations. As Professors Golove and 
Hulsebosch have argued, the young republic was trying to establish its 
credibility as a "civilized nation" that could be trusted to meet its 
obligations under international law. 34 To succeed, the United States 
had to convince foreign audiences that it could faithfully determine 
what those obligations entailed. Perhaps the Justices believed "that the 
judiciary could more effectively establish the good faith of the nation in 
administering the law of nations-and thus boost the credibility of the 
government-if it drew sharp lines separating itself from the more 
politically oriented executive branch."35 In other words, the Jay Court 
avoided advisory opinions because foreign observers would find them 
less credible than pronouncements issued in the course of strictly 
judicial activities. 
The foreign affairs context also plays a central role in the third 
category of explanation, which emphasizes the Justices' domestic 
political priorities. Professor Casto argues that Chief Justice Jay 
thought that he was doing the President a favor by rejecting his request. 
Forcing the executive to rely on its own interpretation of the law of 
nations would strengthen the President's role in foreign affairs, while 
also boosting the position of Alexander Hamilton in the cabinet-both 
of which were congenial to the Federalist politics of the early Justices.36 
32. Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1007 (1924). 
33. Id. at 1003. 
34. David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American 
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
932 (2010). 
35. Id. at 1027. 
36. WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING 
SAIL 117-21 (2006). 
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Professor Arlyck also focuses on the Justices' desire to shift 
responsibility to the President. The Correspondence, he argues, "was an 
attempt to define the fraught territory of foreign relations as an area of 
executive, not judicial, responsibility."37 
The most sustained argument in this vein has been that of 
Professor Jay, who argues that the refusal of 1793 "was neither 
inevitable nor necessary under the contemporary understanding of the 
constitutional role of judges."38 Instead, it reflected two contingent 
political concerns. First, the Washington Administration had asked 
specifically for an opinion about a treaty; and Chief Justice Jay, a 
Federalist, was eager to bolster "the President's independence in 
foreign affairs."39 Second, the Court had an interest in "avoiding public 
controversy."40 The Justices wanted Congress to abolish their onerous 
circuit-riding duties, and their contentious decision in Chisolm v. 
Georgia41 had already made them some enemies. Accordingly, the 
Justices eschewed advisory opinions in favor of other genres-such as 
"informal advice, grand jury charges, dictum in opinions, and decisions 
in actual cases"-that let them broadcast their views through less 
politically charged channels.42 
Importantly, all these explanations describe the Correspondence 
as a uniquely American event-one that responded to the novel 
imperatives of Article III or the distinctive political situation of the 
Founding generation. The one exception is Professor Jay, whose work 
observes that advisory opinions also happened to disappear in England 
in the later eighteenth century. Professor Jay attributes this to the 
goals of Lord Mansfield, the influential Lord Chief Justice at the time 
of Sackville's Case. Jay argues that although Mansfield was happy to 
advise the Crown, he wanted to be known publicly "as a man outside 
party politics."43 Accordingly, he had little to gain from "highly visible" 
written opinions, when his positions as a member of cabinet and in the 
House of Lords gave him other means of influence.44 Ironically, 
however, Professor Jay's comparative perspective actually reinforces 
American exceptionalism by depicting the actions of both chief justices 
as driven by local political concerns. Moreover, none of these 
explanations account for the fate of advisory opinions in common-law 
37. Kevin Arlyck, The Courts and Foreign Affairs at the Founding, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1, 23. 
38. STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES 8 (1997). 
39. Id. at 159-60. 
40. Id. at 161. 
41. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
42. JAY, supra note 38, at 167. 
43. Id. at 50. 
44. Id. at 44-45. 
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colonies outside of the future United States. The next three Parts will 
consider whether such an approach is tenable. 
II. ADVICE-GIVING UNDER THE CLASSICAL COMMON LAW 
Until the late eighteenth century, English judges routinely 
advised the Crown on legal questions. This Part explains the role of 
advisory opinions under what has been described as the "classical" 
common law-the jurisprudence that became orthodox during the 
seventeenth century.45 
Medieval and early modern judges routinely gave legal advice to 
monarchs. 46 This reflected a jurisprudential and political framework 
that imagined judges as both servants of the Crown and oracles of the 
law.47 Judges' oaths required that they ''lawfully ... counsel the King 
in his Business."48 In other words, advisory opinions were part of a 
judge's duty. 49 This notion of judicial service was complemented by a 
conception of judges as oracles. 50 Medieval and early modern judges did 
not see themselves as making law. Instead, the ''law existed before any 
attempts to express it," and a judge's task "was to find that existing law 
and make it known."51 Scholars have offered various theories about the 
source of that preexisting law, including natural law, communal 
custom, and the shared understanding of the profession. 52 For now, 
45. See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OXFORD U. 
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155, 157 (2002) ("Classical common law jurisprudence was articulated by 
reflective but politically engaged jurists in the 17th century."); cf. David J. Ibbetson, Case-Law and 
Doctrine: A Historical Perspective on the English Common Law, in RICHTERRECHT UND 
RECHTSFORTBILDUNG IN DER EUROPA.!SCHEN RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT 27, 29 (Reiner Schulze & 
Ulrike Seif eds., 2003) (describing an "early modern" common law that existed from the sixteenth 
through late eighteenth centuries). 
46. See JAY, supra note 38, at 10--50. 
47. See JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW, at xi (1994); Jay, supra note 23, at 128-
52 (describing judges as "Servants of Monarchs"). 
48. OATH OF THE JUSTICES (1346), in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 305, 305 (Alexander 
Luders ed., London, Dawsons of Pall Mall 1963) (1810). The statute prescribing the oath remained 
in force into the nineteenth century. See, e.g., In re Serjeants at Law (1839) 133 Eng. Rep. 74, 76 
n.2; 6 Bing. (N.C.) 187, 192 n.2; FIFTH REPORT OF HER MAJESTY'S COMMISSIONERS ON CRIMINAL 
LAW 21 (London, W. Clowes & Sons 1840) (describing the judge's oath to serve the king as 
originating during the reign of King Edward IID. 
49. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 151-52 (2008). 
50. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69 (referring to judges as "depositary 
of the laws; the living oracles"). 
51. Emily Kadens, Justice Blackstone's Common Law Orthodoxy, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1553, 
1557 (2009). 
52. See, e.g., William R. Casto, The Early Supreme Court Justices' Most Significant Opinion, 
29 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 173, 204-05 (2002) (''In administering the common law, a judge's duty was 
to identify and apply those principles preexisting in nature."); William A. Fletcher, The General 
Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1984) (describing the early nineteenth-century view that the general 
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what matters is that the declaratory theory made it easy to make sense 
of what advisory opinions did. They-like opinions given during 
litigation-served as evidence of a preexisting law. 53 
That was the theory. But by the seventeenth century, 
contemporaries recognized the possible tension between judges' two 
roles. 54 As the Stuart monarchs learned, it could be useful for a king to 
persuade his judges to issue favorable opinions on controversial 
subjects. 55 This temptation was particularly strong when judges served 
at the pleasure of the king. But even after the Glorious Revolution, 
when judges' tenures had become more secure, commentators continued 
to worry that a tyrannical executive might use extrajudicial opinions to 
shield corrupt or unconstitutional actions. 56 Even in the 1760s, Sir 
Michael Foster described "tak[ing] the Opinion of the Judges" as "a 
Refuge constantly open to a corrupt Administration."57 
Political pressure was not the only concern. Although judges 
were oracles of the law, they were accustomed to speaking with the help 
of their priests-that is, the bar. 58 During the Middle Ages, the common 
law was thought to reside not in the declarations of judges alone but in 
the common opinion shared by the legal profession as a whole.59 By the 
seventeenth century, this notion of the law as communis opinio had 
started to weaken, but courts continued to rely on barristers as crucial 
common law existed by "common practice and consent among a number of sovereigns''); Caleb 
Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARYL. REV. 921, 931-35 
(2013) (discussing the nature and sources of unwritten law); Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 
CALIF. L. REV. 527, 532-34 (2019) (contrasting the positivist view that judges make law with views 
of the common law as derived from natural law, social norms, or custom); A.W.B. Simpson, The 
Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES) 77, 80 
(A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973) ("[T]he common law is best understood as a system of customary law, 
that is, as a body of traditional ideas received within a caste of experts.''). 
53. See, e.g., DAWSON, supra note 47, at 60-61. 
54. See, e.g., J.R. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY, 1603-1689, at 38-39 (1928). 
55. See id. at 39-40. 
56. See infra notes 207-209 and accompanying text (describing the growth of judicial 
independence in the eighteenth century). 
57. MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION OF OYER AND 
TERMINER AND GOAL DELIVERY FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746 IN THE COUNTY 
OF SURRY, AND OF OTHER CROWN CASES TO WHICH ARE ADDED DISCOURSES UPON A FEW BRANCHES 
OF THE CROWN LAW 394 (Dublin, Sarah Cotter 1767) (1762). 
58. Medieval judges had described themselves as the priests. See THOMAS J. MCSWEENEY, 
PRIESTS OF THE LAW: ROMAN LAW AND THE MAKING OF THE COMMON LA W'S FIRST PROFESSIONALS 
1 (2019). By the eighteenth century, the term usually applied to lawyers (often pejoratively). See 
DAVID LEMMINGS, PROFESSORS OF THE LAW: BARRISTERS AND ENGLISH LEGAL CULTURE IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 95, 145 n.178 (2000). 
59. J.H. BAKER, THE LAW'S Two BODIES: SOME EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS IN ENGLISH LEGAL 
HISTORY 75 (2001) (explaining that common opinion "was good evidence as to the state of 
legal doctrine''). 
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collaborators in discovering and declaring the law. 60 Sir Matthew Hale, 
an eminent seventeenth-century jurist, wrote that the "great Weight 
and Authority" of judicial decisions derived not only from judges' 
"greater learning, knowledge, and experience in the laws," but also from 
their having "the best Helps to inform their Judgments."61 Adversarial 
presentation enhanced the accuracy and authority of judicial opinions.62 
Advisory opinions typically lacked that help. 
In response to these concerns, judges developed norms to guide 
their advisory practice. These included group consultation (discussed in 
Section A), obtaining advice from the bar (Section B), avoiding 
prejudgment of issues that might arise in subsequent litigation (Section 
C), and issuing opinions only when they were likely to be followed 
(Section D). These norms were not universal; indeed, judges sometimes 
disagreed about whether they existed at all. But they collectively 
suggest that judges treated advice-giving as a kind of legal procedure-
which, like other kinds of procedures, could be done improperly. 
A. Group Consultation 
Early modern judges typically issued seriatim opinions, rather 
than a single opinion for the court.63 In their advisory work, however, 
judges typically issued joint opinions-primarily, it seems, to 
insulate themselves from royal pressure. And even when judges did 
issue separate opinions, they sought to do so only after consulting 
their colleagues. 
This norm began to emerge as early as Peacham's Case (1615), 
which arose when the Privy Council wanted to prosecute a rector for 
writing a sermon that imagined the King's death, which the King's 
ministers deemed treason. The problem was that the rector had never 
60. See Emily Kadens, The Puzzle of Judicial Education: The Case of Chief Justice William 
De Grey, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 143, 150-51 (2009); see also Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and 
Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 37-38 (1959) (noting that 
colonial American judges cited the authority of "eminent members of the bar"); Peter M. Tiersma, 
The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1231 (2007) (noting that the 
barristers who argued a particular case "were normally experts in their field and may well have 
known more about a specialized subject than the judges"). Even in the 1760s, Blackstone 
discounted the authority of a reported case because it appeared from the report "that very many 
Gentlemen of the Law were dissatisfied" with the decision. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *238-39. 
61. MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 45 (Charles M. Gray 
ed., 1971) (1739). 
62. See NEIL DUXBURY, JURISTS AND JUDGES: AN ESSAY ON INFLUENCE 76 (2001); cf. Matthew 
Steilen, On the Place of Judge-Made Law in a Government of Laws, 3 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 243, 
257-58 (2016) (describing this concern in the work of Chancellor James Kent). 
63. See 1 JOHN BAKER, The Changing Concept of a Court, in COLLECTED PAPERS ON ENGLISH 
LEGAL HISTORY 413, 430-31 (2013). 
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preached or published his "treasonable sermon," which made his 
prosecution doubtful.64 As was usual in such cases, the Attorney 
General-the reliable royal servant Francis Bacon-consulted the 
judges. But instead of asking their opinion collectively, as had been 
customary, he tried to consult them separately. Sir Edward Coke, the 
chief justice of King's Bench, understood the purpose of Bacon's 
approach. Bacon was worried that Coke might convince his colleagues 
that a secret writing could not constitute treason. 65 By buttonholing the 
judges individually, Bacon hoped to build a majority in favor of 
prosecution before Coke could intervene. The chief justice complained 
to Bacon that "such particular and ... auricular taking of opinions was 
not according to the custom of this realm."66 Although Coke eventually 
acquiesced-and delivered an opinion hostile to the Crown67-his 
reluctance contributed to an understanding that seriatim advisory 
opinions were disfavored. The Stuarts continued to seek separate· 
opinions, sometimes successfully.68 But by the eighteenth century, 
Coke's view had prevailed, and the judges' advice typically took the form 
of a jointly signed written opinion. 69 Judges retained the freedom 
to issue separate opinions, but these were issued only after 
group consultation. 70 
B. Advising the Advisors 
As explained above, judges saw the arguments of counsel as 
crucial for helping them to declare the law, and a lack of argument was 
reason to discount the authority of a judicial decision. 71 This remains 
64. TANNER, supra note 54, at 38-39. 
65. Id. at 39. 
66. Letter from Francis Bacon to James I (Jan. 27, 1614), in 5 THE LETTERS AND THE LIFE OF 
FRANCIS BACON 100, 100 (James Spedding ed., London, Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer 1869). 
67. TANNER, supra note 54, at 38-39. 
68. See JAY, supra note 38, at 18 (describing Charles I's successful efforts to obtain separate 
advisory opinions from judges). 
69. See, e.g., OPINION OF THE JUDGES ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE CONVOCATION IN MATIER 
OF HERESY; GIVEN IN THE YEAR 1711, at 16 (London, John Henry Parker 1850) (reprinting an 
opinion signed by multiple judges); The Opinion of the Judges of England About Money Bills in 
Ireland and Poynings Law in Particular 216-17 (1694), SP 63/356 (on file with The National 
Archives, UK) (same); Opinion of the Judges on Questions Concerning the Next Session of 
Parliament (July 12, 1707), PC 1/2/72 (on file with The National Archives, UK) (same). 
70. See, e.g., Opinion of the Judges About Visiting Foreign Ships in Our Ports (Mar. 1, 1699), 
in 10 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC SERIES, OF THE REIGN OF WILLIAM III, at 77, 77-78 
(Edward Bateson ed., 1937) (reporting the solitary dissent of an admiralty judge); The Grand 
Opinion for the Prerogative Concerning the Royal Family (171 7) 92 Eng. Rep. 909; Fort. 401 
(issuing seriatim opinions after conferring as a group). 
71. See BAKER, supra note 63, at 430; Ian Williams, Early-Modern Judges and the Practice of 
Precedent, in JUDGES AND JUDGING IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 51, 63-
64 (Paul Brand & Joshua Getzler eds., 2011) ("Coke regarded 'precedents' in the sense of 
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one of the chief objections to advisory opinions today, 72 and the problem 
was apparent in the seventeenth century. In 1642, member of 
Parliament John Pym condemned "extrajudicial Declarations of Judges 
without hearing of counsel or argument" as "a teeming grievance" that 
produced "many others."73 
Judges mitigated this problem in three ways. First, they 
expressly discounted the authority of extrajudicial pronouncements. In 
1662, for example, Chief Justice Bridgman distinguished ''between 
cases adjudged upon debate and having counsel on both sides, and 
resolution upon a case reported or referred to" the judges without 
argument.74 Second, the judges sometimes heard counsel before giving 
their opinion. In at least one case, they heard counsel for one of the 
parties;75 more often, they took the advice of the Crown's law officers. 76 
Third, the judges sometimes issued their opinion together with 
prominent members of the bar. In 1702, for example, the judges' opinion 
about the scope of martial law was joined by "[t]he Queen's Serjeants, 
Attorney and Solicitor General and all the civilians at Doctors' 
Commons."77 Although joint opinions lacked the benefit of adversarial 
arguments from the record based on writs issued as more powerful where the judges have debated 
them. The notion of debate leading to authority can also be seen with regard to reports of cases."); 
see also Rex v. Corp. of Wigan (1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 560, 561; 2 Burr. 782, 784 (KB) (Mansfield, C.J.) 
(discounting two precedents that "passed without argument or opposition," while favoring "the two 
subsequent precedents cited on the other side ... [that] were debated and fully considered"). 
72. See, e.g., James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party 
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1360 (2015) (explaining that 
the adverse-party requirement is thought to aid judicial decisionmaking). 
73. Speeches Relating to Grievances (Nov. 7, 1640), in 2 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF 
ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLlEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 642 (William Cobbett ed., London, 
T.C. Hansard 1807) [hereinafter PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY] (emphasis added). 
74. Beckman v. Maplesden (1662) 124 Eng. Rep. 468, 478; Bridg. 0. 60, 78 (CP). 
75. In 1717, the judges were asked to resolve a family squabble between George I and his son, 
the Prince of Wales (and future George II). The Grand Opinion for the Prerogative Concerning the 
Royal Family (1717) 92 Eng. Rep. 909, 910; Fort. 401, 402. The King claimed a right as sovereign 
to direct the care and education of the Prince's children. Id. But the Prince claimed that his right 
as a father trumped his father's right as king. Id. at 911. After the Lord Chancellor referred the 
issue to the twelve judges, the Prince requested "that he might be heard by his counsel" before the 
judges made their decision. Id. at 910. The Prince's request highlighted the conflict between judges' 
duties as servants and as oracles. Although they wanted the assistance of counsel, they 
unanimously agreed "that in cases wherein our advice is required by His Majesty, we cannot hear 
counsel without His Majesty's leave." Id. The judges then sought the permission of the King, who 
permitted the judges to hear argument. Id. at 911. 
76. JAY, supra note 38, at 20. 
77. Documents Relating to the Disorders at Port St. Mary's: Opinion of the Judges (Nov. 4, 
1702), in 1 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC SERIES, OF THE REIGN OF ANNE, PRESERVED IN 
THE PuBLIC RECORD OFFICE 285, 286 (Robert Pentland Mahaffy ed., 1916). Later judges expressed 
doubts about the propriety· of including the law officers as cosignatories, preferring to hear them 
as counsel. James Oldham, The Work of Ryder and Murray as Law Officers of the Crown, in LEGAL 
RECORD AND HISTORICAL REALITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY 
CONFERENCE CARDIFF 1987, at 157, 161-64 (Thomas G. Watkin ed., 1989). 
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presentation, they could more plausibly claim to represent the common 
understanding of the profession. 
C. Avoiding Prejudgment 
Judges also tried to ensure that their advisory activities 
wouldn't interfere with their freedom to declare the law in other 
contexts. In some cases, this meant avoiding advisory opinions on issues 
that might later arise in litigation; at other times, the judges reserved 
the right to change their minds. 78 Thus, in Whiston's Case (1 711), the 
judges concluded by declaring their "entire freedom of altering our 
opinions in case any records or proceedings which we are now strangers 
to shall be laid before us, or any new considerations which have not 
occurred to us to be suggested by the parties or their counsel to convince 
us of our mistake."79 
D. Avoiding Unnecessary Opinions 
These procedural norms mitigated, but did not eliminate, the 
dangers of extrajudicial advice. Advisory opinions remained risky, and 
judges accordingly sought to limit their frequency. That meant 
withholding opinions that were unlikely to be followed, as a dispute 
from 174 7 reveals. George II had created a commission, composed of the 
Privy Council and the twelve judges of the common-law courts, to hear 
appeals in prize cases. Some doubts arose about the legality of the 
commission, and Lord Chancellor Hardwicke instructed Attorney 
General Sir Dudley Ryder and Solicitor General William Murray (later 
Lord Mansfield) to brief the judges. 80 Many of the judges refused even 
to meet with Ryder and Murray. The judges' objection was not to giving 
advice or to hearing the presentations of counsel but to the timing of 
the Crown's request. Although "it might have been proper for them to 
have met prior to the passing of the Commission in order to consider 
the legality of it," the judges worried about doing so after the King had 
78. See, e.g., JOHN FORTESCUE, REPORTS OF SELECT CASES IN ALL THE COURTS OF 
WESTMINSTER-HALL 389 (London, Henry Lin tot 17 48) (''The Judges ought not to deliver their 
Opinions before Hand in any Criminal Case that may come before them judicially .... "). Fortescue 
noted that this rule was frequently violated. Id. at 390. 
79. OPINION OF THE JUDGES ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE CONVOCATION IN MATTER OF 
HERESY; GIVEN IN THE YEAR 1711, supra note 69, at 16. To some extent, this reflected judges' more 
general willingness to change their minds when confronted with new evidence of the law, even in 
the context of adjudication. See Williams, supra note 71, at 53-54. But even after judges became 
more reluctant to abandon judicial precedents, they continued to insist on the provisional 
character of their extrajudicial declarations. 
80. Oldham, supra note 77, at 162. 
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already "done what he thought fit." 81 Eventually, they agreed to hear 
the law officers and to con~ider the matter.82 But although the judges 
exchanged opinions with each other,83 they never produced a written 
report for the King. (They also agreed that they "would give no opinion 
in [the] presence" of the Attorney and Solicitor General.84) Instead, they 
merely reported to Hardwicke that they were divided. 85 But that 
collective declaration of ambivalence was enough. In 1749, the cabinet 
drafted, and Parliament enacted, a statute that obviated any doubts 
about the prize commission's lawfulness. 86 The judges had fulfilled their 
advisory function without giving any advice at all. 
* * * 
In 1775, the barrister and antiquarian Francis Hargrave used a 
footnote in his new edition of Coke Upon Littleton to criticize advisory 
opinions. "[I]t must be admitted," Hargrave conceded, that such 
opinions had a long history. 87 "But however numerous and strong the 
precedents may be," he continued, "it is a right to be understood with 
many exceptions, and such as ought to be exercised with great 
reserve."88 Most importantly, judges ought "rigid[ly]" to avoid giving 
"opinions on causes actually depending."89 He alluded to other norms 
that limited the Crown's right to advice, but he declined "to be more 
particular on a subject of so much delicacy, by attempting to mark the 
bounds to a right, the extent of which we do not find clearly ascertained 
by precedent or authority."90 
This Part has tried to make those norms more explicit. Like 
Hargrave, eighteenth-century judges did not always explain their 
81. Hargrave Ms. 431, at 6 (Nov. 30, 1748) (on file with the British Library). 
82. Notes of Sir William Lee (Dec. 1748), OSB MSS 52/11/1-8 (on file with the Beinecke Rare 
Book & Manuscript Library, Yale University). 
83. Hargrave Ms. 431, supra note 81, at 18 (reporting that the judges came to Chief Justice 
Lee's chambers on December 6 and 9, 17 48, and "delivered their opinions on the Commission"). 
Justice Burnet "sent his opinion by writing." Id. 
84. Hargrave Ms. 431, supra note 81, at 6. 
85. Oldham, supra note 77, at 163-64. 
86. Prize Causes Act 1748, 22 Geo. 2 c. 3. The cabinet was a small group of high-ranking 
ministers and royal advisers. See Ian R. Christie, The Cabinet During the Grenville 
Administration, 1763-1765, 73 ENG. HIST. REV. 86-87 (1958); Philip Lawson, Further Reflections 
on the Cabinet in the Early Years of George Ill's Reign, 57 HIST. RSCH. 237, 237-38 (1984). 
87. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A 
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advisory practice, perhaps because its vagueness was a useful tool for 
dodging the Crown's demands. 91 The numbers bear this out: although 
we lack an official register of advisory opinions, no monarch after 1660 
seems to have obtained more than a handful. 92 They remained an 
accepted but carefully circumscribed part of the duty of English judges. 
III. THE DEMISE OF ADVISORY OPINIONS 
The classical common law provided a framework that 
accommodated advisory opinions while seeking to mitigate their risks. 
In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, that framework 
broke down, and judges throughout the common-law world tried harder 
to escape their roles as advisors. 
This Part describes this development through three case studies. 
Section A offers a new view of Sackuille's Case, the last written advisory 
opinion given to the British Crown. 93 The judges in that case granted 
the request for advice, but their evident reluctance to do so contributed 
to a new norm against the Crown soliciting formal legal advice at all. 
Section B takes the story to British-controlled Bengal, where judges on 
the Supreme Court of Judicature similarly sought to limit their 
advisory role, in ways that went beyond what the classical model 
required. Section C retells the more familiar story of the Jay Court's 
refusal in 1 793. 
A. England 
Sackuille's Case began with a disgraced cavalry officer's attempt 
to salvage his reputation. At the Battle of Minden in 1759, Lord George 
Sackville received ambiguous orders to pursue retreating French 
troops. Sackville failed to advance, and his superior, Prince Ferdinand 
of Brunswick-Wolfenbiittel, blamed him for allowing France to escape 
a decisive defeat. 94 Sackville resigned his commission and returned to 
91. For the idea that early modern judges saw vagueness as a bulwark against tyranny, see 
Christian R. Burset, Redefining the Rule of Law: An Eighteenth-Century Case Study, AM. J. 
COMPAR. L. (forthcoming 2022). 
92. See Book Review: The Judges of England, with Sketches of Their Lives, and Miscellaneous 
Notices Connected with the Courts at Westminster, from the Time of the Conquest, by Edward Foss, 
L. MAG. & L. REV. OR Q.J. JURIS., Nov. 1858-Feb. 1859, at 31, 39 (counting advisory opinions). That 
list is imperfect-for example, it seems to count an opinion given to George II as given to George 
III-but it indicates a general downward trend after the Restoration. Id. 
93. But cf. infra Appendix (discussing a possible exception). 
94. ANDREW JACKSON O'SHAUGHNESSY, THE MEN WHO LoST AMERICA: BRITISH LEADERSHIP, 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AND THE FATE OF THE EMPIRE 168-69 (2013). 
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London, where the press condemned his alleged cowardice.95 Sackville 
maintained that he had acted properly, and he decided that the only 
way to restore his good name was to have a court-martial judge 
his actions. 96 
As soon as the court-martial commenced, however, its members 
expressed doubts about two important issues. First, Sackville was no 
longer in the army; could he still be tried under military law? Second, 
was the court-martial authorized to impose a capital sentence?97 The 
court-martial's members were army officers without legal training, and 
they asked the King "to direct the Judges of the Land to give their 
opinion."98 George II agreed to do so. 99 
The judges eventually issued an opinion, but only on the first 
question, and only after initially refusing to say anything at all. Why? 
The prevailing explanation is that Lord Mansfield, arguably the most 
influential judge in England at the time, took the lead in resisting the 
King's request.100 This Mansfield-centered story has an important 
implication: it suggests that the demise of advisory opinions in England 
was largely the product of his own idiosyncratic priorities. 101 This 
interpretation is plausible-George II himself blamed Mansfield for the 
judges' obstinacy102-but a careful review of the evidence suggests 
something different. As it turns out, the judges were all reluctant to 
decide Sackville's Case; and to the extent that Mansfield's views stood 
out, it was because he was more willing to accommodate the Crown, not 
less. 103 As a result, we need to explain the decline of advisory opinions 
by looking beyond Mansfield's personal preferences. 
95. PIERS MACKESY, THE COWARD OF MINDEN: THE AFFAIR OF LoRD GEORGE SACKVILLE 158-
61 (1979). 
96. Id. at 161-64. This was a risky maneuver. Two years earlier, Britain had executed 
Admiral John Byng after a court-martial found that he had failed "to do his utmost" to engage the 
French navy. N.A.M. RODGER, THE COMMAND OF THE OCEAN: A NAVAL HISTORY OF BRITAIN 1649-
1815, at 267 (2004). The government also had much to lose. An acquittal would antagonize 
Britain's popular ally Prince Ferdinand, see FRED ANDERSON, CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN 
YEARS' W ARAND THE FATE OF EMPIRE IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1766, at 300 (2001), while 
a conviction would rekindle the political controversy over Byng's execution, see SARAH KINKEL, 
DISCIPLINING THE EMPIRE: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND THE RISE OF THE BRITISH NAVY 130--
38 (2018). 
97. At a General Court Martial 2 (Feb. 29, 1760) WO 71/134 (on file with The National 
Archives, UK). 
98. Id. 
99. See Certificate of the Judges Respecting the Court-Martial Proposed to Be Held upon 
Lord George Sackville (1760) 28 Eng. Rep. 940, 940; 2 Eden 371, 371. 
100. JAY, supra note 38, at 44-45; Pushaw, supra note 30, at 475-76. 
101. See JAY, supra note 38, at 44-45 (describing Mansfield's desire to avoid political damage 
that could result from issuing an advisory opinion in Sackuille's Case). 
102. See MACKESY, supra note 95, at 181-82 (describing the King's anger with Mansfield). 
103. See id. There are other signs that Mansfield was comparatively unconcerned about 
advisory activity. In Perrin u. Blake, Mansfield was part of the Privy Council committee that heard 
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First, though, it's important to set out what happened. 104 The 
court-martial asked for guidance on February 29, 1760. The cabinet met 
that night to consider the issue, as the Duke of Newcastle later reported 
to William Pitt. 105 (Newcastle and Pitt were effectively co-prime 
ministers. Newcastle had been present at the cabinet meeting, but Pitt 
had been too ill to attend.) The cabinet agreed nearly unanimously that 
the first question, concerning the court-martial's jurisdiction, should be 
referred to the judges. 106 Newcastle made a point of noting that the 
lawyers present had shared this consensus. Lord Hardwicke, the 
respected former Lord Chancellor, had "thought the reference 
extremely proper in a case of this nature, relating to the jurisdiction of 
an inferior court."107 Mansfield also "concurred," although he asked 
an appeal from Jamaica about the construction of wills. JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE 
PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 325 (1950). The question presented was both 
important and difficult, and Mansfield thought the Privy Council wasn't up to answering it. See 
id. Although the Privy Council was the court of last resort for colonial appeals, it consisted mostly 
of nonlawyers, and it had a poor reputation for legal analysis. P.A. HOWELL, THE JUDICIAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL 1833-1876: ITS ORIGINS, STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 8-9 
(1979). Accordingly, Mansfield proposed to refer the case to King's Bench (of which he was chief 
justice), so that the Privy Council would render judgment based on that court's advice. See SMITH, 
supra, at 325 & n.338. This would not have been an advisory opinion strictly speaking, because 
the reference would have come from the King "in his judicial capacity." Hodgson v. Ambrose (1780) 
99 Eng. Rep. 216, 220 n.3; 1 Doug!. 337, 344 n.3. Nonetheless, Mansfield's fellow judges refused to 
accept the reference, and they insisted on Perrin being brought in King's Bench as a feigned action. 
SMITH, supra, at 326. Another example came a few years later, during a debate in the House of 
Lords about a controversial colonial statute. Mansfield, eager for political reasons to have the 
statute declared void, "demanded that the opinions of the judges might be taken." Letter from 
Horace Walpole to Horace Mann (May 24, 1767), in 22 THE YALE EDITION OF HORACE WALPOLE'S 
CORRESPONDENCE 519, 520 (W.S. Lewis ed., 1960). The Lords rejected Mansfield's demand, and 
one observer thought the other "judges would not have given their opinions if asked." Id.; see also 
SMITH, supra, at 631-35 (discussing this incident). 
104. The story has been well told by JAY, supra note 38, at 31-34, but this Article departs from 
his account in one crucial way. Although Professor Jay consulted a broad combination of primary 
and secondary sources, the structure of his narrative relied on work by Dr. Piers Mackesy, a 
respected military historian. Id. at 214 n.81. Dr. Mackesy's account indicated that Mansfield 
refused to issue an opinion until he attended a cabinet meeting at which the Duke of Newcastle 
convinced him to change his mind. MACKESY, supra note 95, at 181-82. Professor Jay quite 
reasonably adopted this sequence of events. But the relevant letters indicate that the cabinet 
meeting happened first. In other words, Mansfield was initially willing to give an opinion, but his 
meeting with the other judges discouraged him from doing so. See infra notes 105---120 and 
accompanying text. 
105. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to William Pitt (Mar. 1, 1760), in 2 CORRESPONDENCE 
OF WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM 23, 23-24 (William Stanhope Taylor & John Henry Pringle 
eds., London, John Murray 1838). 
106. There was a heated dissent from Lord Granville, who insisted "with great vehemence" 
that Sackville "was not triable by a court-martial; that the Judges had nothing to do with it; and 
that it was wronger still to refer it to them." Id. It is not clear why he objected or why he thought 
the issue so obvious. A few weeks earlier, the Attorney and Solicitor General had given their 
opinion that Sackville was indeed triable by a court-martial. Letter from Charles Pratt & Charles 
Yorke to Lord Holdernesse (Jan. 12, 1760), State Papers 41/23, at 311r, 312r (on file with The 
National Archives, UK). 
107. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to William Pitt (Mar. 1, 1760), supra note 105, at 24. 
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that, ''being a judge," his name be omitted from the record. 108 On the 
second question, concerning Sackville's possible punishment, "it was 
unanimously agreed, that it would be highly improper to refer that to 
the Judges."109 The reason, Newcastle explained, was that the question 
"was indeed desiring to know of them what the court was to do, which 
depended upon themselves."110 In other words, Sackville, if convicted, 
might appeal to those same judges, and it would have been improper to 
demand a preview of their answer. Pitt replied to Newcastle that this 
was "perfectly right."111 
So far, so good. But there was a logistical hurdle. The court-
martial needed "a speedy answer." 112 Britain was still at war, and many 
of the court's members and witnesses were active-duty officers.113 But 
the judges were about to ride their semiannual circuit around England, 
and at least one judge had already departed. Somebody (perhaps 
Mansfield) indicated that those who remained might not answer the 
question presented until they had all returned to London. 114 The judges' 
attitude might simply have reflected the long-standing norm of group 
consultation.115 But whatever the cause, the delay exposed Mansfield to 
acute political danger. 116 A rumor was spreading that Mansfield had 
encouraged the judges to stall: Mansfield and Sackville, it was said, 
were friends, and Mansfield wasn't eager to see Sackville put on trial 
for his life. 117 Newcastle urged Mansfield, his friend and former protege, 
to get the judges to cooperate as quickly as possible--or to find someone 
else to blame for their delay. "I know there are those in the highest 
stations of the Law who say it may be done," Newcastle wrote; "at least 
let it appear that if it is not done it is not your fault .... For God's sake 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 24-25. 
111. Letter from William Pitt to the Duke of Newcastle (Mar. 1, 1760), Add. Ms. 32903, at 17 
(on file with the British Library). 
112. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to William Pitt, supra note 105, at 25. 
113. Sackville himself had declined to call certain witnesses out of fear that doing so would 
compromise military operations. 1 HIST. MANuSCRIPI'S COMM'N, REPORT ON THE MANuSCRIPTS OF 
MRS. STOPFORD-SACKVILLE, OF DRAYTON HOUSE, NORTHAMPTONSHIRE 318 (1904). 
114. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to William Pitt (Mar. 1, 1760), supra note 105, at 25 
&n.1. 
115. Supra Section II.A. 
116. See Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to [Andrew] Stone (Mar. 1, 1760), Add. Ms. 32903, 
at 10, 10 (on file with the British Library); Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Mansfield 
(Mar. 1, 1760), Add. Ms. 32903, at 6 (on file with the British Library). 
117. See, e.g., Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to [Andrew] Stone, supra note 116, at 11 
(''The King is extremely hurt with Lord Mansfield. . . . He takes it to be Friendship to Lord 
George."); see also 3 HORACE WALPOLE, MEMOIRS OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE THE SECOND 252-
55 (Lord Holland ed., 2d ed. rev., London, Henry Colburn 1846) (describing Mansfield's supposed 
friendship with Sackville). 
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consider whether it may not be proper for the remaining Judges to give 
an answer."ll8 Mansfield, however, insisted that he couldn't help. He 
had already explained to Newcastle he had no objection to advising the 
King on this issue, even publicly.u9 But Newcastle would "have no 
opinion from the Judges"120-not because Mansfield himself was 
unwilling, but because his colleagues could "not be induced to give a 
separate Opinion."121 
Two days later, the judges changed their minds, for unclear 
reasons. The eleven who remained in London issued a short, jointly 
signed statement that they saw "no ground to doubt of the legality of 
the jurisdiction of a Court-Martial in the case put by the above 
question."122 Their opinion included a conventional caveat: 
But as the matter may several ways be brought, in due course of law, judicially before 
some ofus ... we shall be ready, without difficulty, to change our opinion, ifwe see cause, 
upon objections that may be then laid before us, though none have occurred to us at 
present which we think sufficient. 123 
So far, the judges' actions reflected the classical norms described 
in Part II, particularly the emphasis on group consultation. But when 
Mansfield transmitted the opinion to the Crown, his cover letter added 
a new wrinkle. The judges, he reported, 
are exceedingly thankful to his Majesty for his tenderness in not sending any question to 
them till the necessity of such reference became manifest and urgent .... In general, they 
are very averse to giving extra-judicial opinions, especially where they affect a particular 
case; but the circumstances of the trial now depending ease us of difficulties upon this 
occasion, and we have laid in our claim not to be bound by this answer. 124 
Mansfield's letter indicated a deeper opposition to advisory opinions 
than the classical common law would have suggested. 
Sackville's Case only became a landmark in retrospect. At least 
into the 1780s, observers continued to assume that advisory opinions 
were permissible. 125 Nonetheless, it appears to have been the last 
118. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Mansfield, supra note 116. 
119. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to [Andrew] Stone, supra note 116, at 11. 
120. Letter from Lord Mansfield to the Duke of Newcastle (Mar. 1, 1760), Add. Ms. 32903, at 
8 (on file with the British Library). 
121. Letter from Lord Barrington to the Duke of Newcastle (Mar. 1, 1760), Add. Ms. 32903, at 
12 (on file with the British Library). 
122. Certificate of the Judges Respecting the Court-Martial Proposed To Be Held upon Lord 
George Sackville (1760) 28 Eng. Rep. 940, 940-41; 2 Eden. 371, 371. 
123. Id. 
124. Letter of Lord Mansfield to the Lord Keeper, Enclosing the Above Certificate (1760) 28 
Eng. Rep. 941, 941; 2 Eden 373, 373 (emphasis added). 
125. In 1772, Benjamin Franklin presented the colonial secretary, Lord Dartmouth, with a 
controversial petition from Massachusetts. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Cushing 
(Dec. 2, 1772), in 19 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 399, 409 (William B. Willcox ed., 1959). 
Dartmouth counseled against forwarding it to George III. Id. at 409. The King, Dartmouth warned, 
might "require the Opinion of the Judges or Government Lawyers, which would surely be against" 
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formal advisory opinion that English judges gave to the executive.126 
Some observers might have missed it, but the Crown's relations with 
the judiciary had changed.127 
B. Bengal 
In 1765, the British East India Company became the de facto 
ruler of Bengal. Under a grant from the Mughal Emperor, the Company 
gained the right to collect taxes from, and the responsibility to 
administer justice for, the region's more than twenty million 
inhabitants.128 Eight years later, in response to the perceived failures 
of Company rule, Parliament passed the Regulating Act, which created 
a new governance structure for British India. The statute placed 
executive and legislative authority in the hands of a governor-general 
and four-member council, who were accountable to the Company but 
effectively appointed by government ministers. (The act itself named 
the first four councilors.)129 It also authorized the Crown to charter 
a new Supreme Court of Judicature, to be staffed by royally 
appointed judges. 130 
From the beginning, the SCJ and the Council disagreed about 
their relationship. In particular, three views emerged about the SCJ's 
duty to render advisory opinions. The first view belonged to Governor-
General Warren Hastings, who enthusiastically sought the judges' 
advice. The Regulating Act had empowered the Council to legislate with 
the "consent and approbation" of the SCJ.131 Hastings argued that the 
judges should therefore participate in the legislative process, and he 
proposed giving the chief justice "a fixed or occasional seat at the 
the petition. Id. Neither Franklin nor Dartmouth was a lawyer, and Franklin's account of the 
meeting might not have been accurate. See id. n.4. Nonetheless, Franklin's comment indicates that 
advisory opinions were not obviously out of bounds. For an example from the 1780s, see infra 
Appendix. 
126. But cf. infra Appendix (discussing a possible exception). 
127. By the way, Sackville landed on his feet. The court-martial declared him "unfit to serve 
his Majesty in any military capacity whatever"-a verdict humiliating enough to appease George 
II but too trifling to justify a capital sentence or even to permanently damage his political career. 
O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 94, at 169. George II died six months later, which cleared the way for 
Sackville's rehabilitation. He resumed his work as a member of Parliament, and in 1775 he became 
secretary of state for the American colonies, in which capacity he served as primary architect of 
the failed war against their independence. See id. at 165-206. 
128. P.J. MARSHALL, THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF EMPIRES: BRITAIN, INDIA, AND AMERICA 
C.1750-1783, at 207 (2005). 
129. Id. at 213. 
130. Charter of Justice, Dated 26th March 177 4, in THE RULES AND ORDERS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF JUDICATURE AT FORT WILLIAM IN BENGAL 135, 135 (Longueville Clarke ed., Calcutta, 
Samuel Smith & Co. 1829). 
131. Regulating Act 1773, 13 Geo. 3 c. 63, § 36. 
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Council Board."132 His attitude reflected his long-standing friendship 
with Sir Elijah Impey, the first chief justice, whom he hoped to gain as 
an ally in the Council's political struggles. 133 
Hastings's opponents on the council-John Clavering, George 
Monson, and Philip Francis-developed a second view, which was more 
circumspect about judicial advice. 134 To some extent, they were 
suspicious of lmpey's friendship with Hastings; but their attitude also 
reflected their belief that the SCJ and the Council ought to be mutually 
independent. For example, they argued that the SCJ was meant to 
review the Council's regulations "in the nature of an appeal, the Benefit 
of which would be lost, if there were any previous Communication and 
agreement between the Legislative and Judicial Powers."135 As a 
result, it would be improper not only for the judges to attend Council 
meetings, but even for them to offer "an extrajudicial opinion" about 
proposed legislation. 136 If the Council needed advice, it ought to get its 
own lawyer.137 
Francis, the faction's leader, was especially sensitive to 
separation-of-powers concerns. When a dispute arose about Hastings's 
authority to dissolve the Council, some of his colleagues suggested that 
the matter be settled by obtaining an opinion of counsel. Francis 
rejected that idea. Although individual councilors could seek advice as 
they saw fit, he "disapprove[d] of submitting the internal Rights and 
powers of the Supreme Council" to the judgment of private attorneys.138 
"I am of the same opinion with respect to the Judges," he continued. 139 
The matter could "never come regularly before them" as a court; and it 
would be improper for them to furnish "an extrajudicial opinion."140 
132. Letter from Warren Hastings to Lord North (Apr. 2, 1775), in 1 MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF 
THE RIGHT HON. WARREN HASTINGS, FIRST GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL 534, 542 (G.R. Gleig 
ed., London, Richard Bentley 1841) [hereinafter HAsTINGSMEMOIRS]. 
133. See LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COWNIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY, 
1400-1900, at 136 n.14 (2002) (discussing Hastings's friendship with lmpey); ROBERT TRAVERS, 
IDEOWGY AND EMPIRE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY INDIA: THE BRITISH IN BENGAL 186--87 (2007) 
(indicating that Hastings used the court to pursue political goals). 
134. For the factions on the council, see TRAVERS, supra note 133, at 145-46. 
135. Memorandum from John Clavering, George Monson & Phillip Francis (Apr. 12, 1774), 
Add. Ms. 29207, at 52 (on file with the British Library). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Letter from Philip Francis to John Clavering (Mar. 19, 1775), Mss. Eur. E15, at 87 (on 
file with the British Library). The issue was eventually submitted to several eminent attorneys in 
England, who generally concluded that Hastings had the power to dissolve the Council. JAMES 
FlTZJAMES STEPHEN, SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES FlTZJAMES STEPHEN: THE STORY OF 
NUNCOMAR AND THE IMPEACHMENT OF SIR ELIJAH IMPEY 46 n.§ (Lisa Rodensky ed., 2013). 
139. Letter from Philip Francis to John Clavering, supra note 138, at 87. 
140. Id. at 87-88; see also id. (arguing that any opinion from the judges would not "carry any 
other Authority, than that of eminent Lawyers, by which we might or might not be directed"). 
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Instead of seeking external advice, the councilors themselves should 
trust their own ability "to understand the Law, under which [they] 
act."141 Excessive deferral to the judges, he warned, would elevate the 
court into "the first power of the State."142 
The third and most restrictive view of advisory opinions came 
from the judges themselves. Their position became clear following the 
arrest of a senior Indian official named Nandakumar, who had been 
accused of forgery. 143 Nandakumar complained to the Council that the 
conditions of his confinement were inconsistent with his religious 
practices. 144 The Council asked Impey to investigate. He did so and 
reported back in a letter that assured the Council of his desire to 
accommodate prisoners' beliefs while also warning against "suffer[ing] 
the pretence of Religion to be set up to elude the ordinary course of 
Justice."145 But Impey was less concerned about the merits of 
Nandakumar's petition than the Council's willingness to receive it. In 
the future, the chief justice insisted, prisoners should apply directly to 
the court. Otherwise, the Council's intervention in high-profile cases 
might undermine the court's appearance of impartiality. 146 
The Council-more precisely, the majority composed of Francis, 
Clavering, and Monson147-construed Impey's letter as an attack on 
their authority. 148 Impey then tried to backtrack. He professed "infinite 
concern that any thing in my former letter could by any strained 
construction be interpreted to question the authority of the Board."149 
He would never have suggested anything of the sort, he explained, 
because "[t]he bounds between the Authority of the Supreme Court and 
141. Id. at 88. 
142. Id. 
143. He was eventually executed for that crime. See, e.g., P.J. MARsHALL, THE IMPEACHMENT 
OF WARREN HAsTINGS 135-36 (1965). His trial occasioned immediate and enduring debate about 
whether Hastings had rigged the proceedings to silence his political enemy and the extent to which 
English criminal law should be administered in India. See, e.g., MARsHALL, supra, at 141; 
STEPHEN, supra note 138, at xv. 
144. Nandakumar alleged that he was unable to perform religious ceremonies in prison or to 
eat in any "room where Christians or Mussulmen had been." Letter from Elijah Impey to the 
Governor-Gen. & Council (May 9, 1775), Add. Ms. 16265, at 23r (on file with the British Library). 
145. Id. at 24r. 
146. Id. at 24v. 
147. Although the letters in this series were signed from the "governor-general and council," 
at least some appear to have been sent over Hastings's objection. See Letter from Warren Hastings 
to Graham & Macleane (May 20, 1775), Add. Ms. 29127, at 202v, 203r (on file with the British 
Library) ("The majority have commenced a war with the Chief Justice & the Judges, & in a Spirit 
peculiar to themselves."). 
148. See Letter from John Clavering, George Monson & Phillip Francis to Lord Rochford (May 
16, 1775), Mss. Eur. E13, at 389 (on file with the British Library). 
149. Letter from Elijah lmpey to the Governor-Gen. & Council (May 15, 1775), Add. Ms. 16265, 
at 26r (on file with the British Library). 
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the Council are of too delicate a nature to be discussed" unless 
absolutely necessary.150 But that annoyed the Council even more. "We 
do not agree" that the boundary between the court's and the Council's 
authority is "too delicate" to be discussed, they replied; "we think that 
the lawful powers of every branch of government should be fixed and 
declared, and particularly that the limits of the Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court should be ascertained."151 In other words, the Council 
wanted Impey to spell out the SCJ's jurisdiction. 
This time, the Council drew a response from the full court. The 
letter reiterated the chief justice's warning that it was dangerous to 
chat about "delicate" jurisdictional matters and insisted that the judges 
"have no authority to make, extrajudicially, a more particular 
declaration, or description of the powers of the Court."152 The judges, in 
other words, said they could not render an advisory opinion about their 
own jurisdiction. 
This created a problem. Bengal had a tangle of competing 
courts-some controlled by the Company, others by the Crown-and it 
was important to specify the lines of authority. 153 The Council, 
concerned about the consequences of unresolvable jurisdictional 
conflicts, took the extraordinary step of suspending an important civil 
court, the sadr diwani adalat, pending the SCJ's opinion.154 Impey had 
no interest in being blamed for the court's closure, and he complained 
that the Council was acting as if the judges had said "it was improper 
that it should be defined and known over whom the Court hath or hath 
not Jurisdiction."155 But they had only refused to address two subjects: 
the Council's power to review judges' decisions (such as their 
imprisonment of Nandakumar) and the Council's "Right to 
communicate Petitions to the Judges." 156 
Now, with Bengal's judiciary descending into chaos, the judges 
felt compelled to explain themselves. With respect to the first point, 
150. Id. 
151. Letter from the Governor-Gen. & Council to Elijah Impey (May 16, 1775), Add. Ms. 16265, 
at 27r-27v (on file with the British Library). 
152. Letter from the Sup. Ct. of Judicature to the Governor-Gen. & Council (May 20, 1775), in 
2 SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, DESPATCHES, AND OTHER STATE PAPERS PRESERVED IN THE 
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 1772-1785, at 378, 378 (George W. Forrest 
ed., Calcutta, Superintendent of Gov't Printing 1890). 
153. See HALLIDAY, supra note 10, at 281-89. 
154. Letter from the Governor-Gen. & Council to Sup. Ct. of Judicature (May 23, 1775), in 5 
REPORTS FROM COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: EAST lNDIES-1781, 1782, at 441, 441 
(London, reprinted by Ord. of the House 1804) [hereinafter REPORTS]; Extract of Bengal Revenue 
Consultations (May 23, 1775), in REPORTS, supra, at 440. 
155. Letter from Elijah Impey to the Governor-Gen. & Council (May 25, 1775), Add. Ms. 16265, 
at 29v (on file with the British Library). 
156. Id. at 30r. 
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lmpey considered it his "Duty on the part of the Judges to assert, 'That 
there doth not reside in the Governor General and Council any legal 
authority what so ever to review and control any Judicial acts of the 
Judges done either in or out of Court, be those acts ever so 
erroneous.' "157 This short statement, issued jointly on behalf of all the 
judges, reads like a classic advisory opinion. But then, turning to the 
second question, lmpey seemed to say that advisory opinions were 
impermissible: "[N]o Board even of the highest authority in England 
can refer any matter either to a Court of Justice or any Judge thereof, 
otherwise than by suit legally instituted."158 Taken together, these two 
statements indicated that the judges might occasionally be willing to 
give advice, but that the Council had no right to seek it. 
This was not because the judges wanted to keep their powers 
vague. As lmpey emphasized, they had promulgated rules of procedure 
meant to clarify their jurisdiction, and his first charge to the grand jury 
had covered the same topic. "[T]o give sanction to it," lmpey continued, 
"I asked [the other judges] publickly [sic] whether they concurred with 
me, & had the satisfaction of their full concurrence."159 Moreover, lmpey 
had been willing to "converse" with councilors privately-and even "to 
give answers in writing"-''but always with this reserve that my 
Judgment should not be considered bound by any extrajudicial 
opinion."160 The only thing that Impey shouldn't do, he concluded, 
was "authoritatively ascertain" questions of law outside of 
ordinary litigation.161 
This response failed to satisfy the Council, and the sadr diwani 
adalat remained closed. A few days later, the justices relented and 
rendered the opinion that the Council had demanded. 162 In doing so, 
they took the same approach as the English justices in 1760: issuing an 
advisory opinion while warning against asking for more. Their short 
letter clarified the SCJ's jurisdiction, and particularly its relationship 
to Company-run courts. The letter also offered several qualifications. 
Like the judges in Sackville's Case, lmpey and his colleagues thanked 
the Council for its "Caution ... in submitting Questions to us." 163 (One 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 30r-30v. 
160. Id. at 30v. 
161. Id. 
162. Letter from Elijah Impey, Stephen Caesar LeMaistre & John Hyde to the Governor-Gen. 
& Council (May 28, 1775), in REPORTS, supra note 154, at 441. Justice Chambers was out of town, 
but his colleagues asserted that he would have agreed with their opinion. Id. 
163. Id. 
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detects a hint of sarcasm.) Advisory opinions were to be rarely sought 
and rarely given. 
The letter then explained why the present situation merited 
an exception: 
Though we are not in general justifiable [i.e., subject to your jurisdiction], and therefore 
ought to be reserved in delivering extra-judicial Opinions; we are at all times desirous of 
affording you every Assistance and Information that is compatible with our Duty. As the 
Questions now proposed will, as we apprehend, never come judicially before us, and as we 
shall thereby prevent the Suspension of Justice, we are much pleased to feel ourselves at 
liberty to give you direct and full Answers.1 64 
This passage made several arguments. First, the justices reminded the 
Council of their independence ("not in general justifiable"). Unlike 
English judges, the SCJ's justices had no duty to advise. Second, 
maintaining that independence required that advice be given sparingly 
("we ... therefore ought to be reserved in delivering extrajudicial 
opinions"). Indeed, the justices hinted that only an exceptional 
circumstance-in this case, the "suspension" of Company-controlled 
courts-justified their cooperation. Third, extrajudicial opinions were 
only appropriate on matters that would never arise "judicially," that is, 
in the course of litigation. (They did not say whether this was because 
this eliminated the risk of prejudging a future case or because there 
would otherwise be no way for the judges to address the issue.) Only 
when these conditions were satisfied, the justices concluded, would they 
be "at liberty" to answer extrajudicial inquiries; and even then, they 
need not do so. 165 
The Council got the letter but not the message. It continued to 
demand advisory opinions, which the judges repeatedly refused to give. 
In July 1775, they expressed their "deepest concern" that "the Council 
still persist[ed], notwithstanding the frequent declarations and 
unanimous opinion of the Court," to demand advice. 166 One especially 
obnoxious request asked the judges to decide whether the Crown or the 
Company was the sovereign of Bengal-one of the most contentious 
questions in British law and politics. 167 Impey, on behalf of the judges, 
replied that the SCJ would decide the question "if it became absolutely 
necessary"-such as during litigation-but the justices "would avoid it 
164. Id. For justifiable, see the second definition of that word in OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
(3d ed. 2013), https://oed.com/view/Entry/102219 [https://perma.cc/7GNE-YAE6]. 
165. Letter from Elijah Impey, Stephen Caesar LeMaistre & John Hyde to the Governor-Gen. 
& Council (May 28, 1775), supra note 162, at 441. 
166. Opinion of the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature (July 6, 1775), in 20 A COMPLETE 
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, 1771-1777, at 1135, 1136 (T.B. Howell ed., 1814) (Impey, C.J.). 
167. See, e.g., Spencer A. Leonard, 'The Capital Object of the Public': The 1766-7 
Parliamentary Inquiry into the East India Company, 132 ENG. HIST. REV. 1110, 1143 (2017). 
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if [they] could."168 In any event, he continued, "we would not give [an 
opinion] until we had heard every thing that could be said on either 
side, nor until we had obtained all the lights and information that could 
be obtained on the subject."169 Although Impey professed his willingness 
to provide "every right and every assistance, judicially or extra-
judicially, which I think I legally may," he reiterated his opposition to 
advisory opinions.110 
Impey and Hyde found themselves compelled to make a similar 
argument a few months later. ''We ... must decline to make a 
Precedent of submitting to answer Questions ... which you have 
neither grounds nor right to put to us," they scolded the Council. 171 As 
in England, the justices were willing to offer advice in their private 
capacities.172 But they continued to resist the Council's calls for official 
legal advice. 
The judges made some exceptions. In 1777, the government fell 
into disarray when its members disagreed about who was actually 
governor-general. Clavering and Francis claimed that Hastings had 
resigned and that Clavering had succeeded to his position. Awkwardly 
for them, Hastings insisted that he remained in office. 173 The two sides 
agreed to submit their dispute to the judges, who returned a unanimous 
opinion a few hours later, declaring that Hastings was governor-
general.174 Even in the midst of that crisis, however, the judges sought 
to limit their advisory role. Although the contending councilors had 
appealed to the judges' "judgment and authority" to settle the 
dispute, 175 the judges emphasized their wish "to deliver such an opinion 
as from the reasoning of it, not from its authority, might" resolve the 
matter.176 They added that only "the fatal consequences of a divided 
Government" could have persuaded them "to deliver any opinion at 
168. Opinion of the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature (July 6, 1775), supra note 166, at 1141. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 1137. 
171. Letter from Elijah Impey & John Hyde to the Governor-Gen. & Council (Sept. 9, 1775), 
Add. Ms. 16265, at 55r (on file with the British Library). 
172. See, e.g., Letter from Elijah Impey to Warren Hastings (Jan. 11, 1776), Add. Ms. 29137, 
at 9 (on file with the British Library); Opinion of Sir R. Chambers on a Question Referred to Him, 
([after 1774]), Taussig Collection, box 48, folder 355, at 139 (on file with the Beinecke Rare Book 
& Manuscript Library, Yale University). 
173. SOPHIA WEITZMAN, WARREN HASTINGS AND PHILIP FRANCIS 103-04 (1929). 
174. Letter from the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature to John Clavering & Philip Francis (June 
20, 1777) [hereinafter SCJ Letter), in 12 BENGAL: PAST & PRESENT 11, 15 (W.K. Firminger 
ed., 1916). 
175. Address from John Clavering & Philip Francis to the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature 
(June 20, 1777), in 12 BENGAL: PAST & PRESENT, supra note 174, at 8, 10. 
176. SCJ Letter, supra note 17 4, at 15 (emphasis added). 
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all."177 This was meant, in other words, to be a rare exception----one in 
which the judges spoke as counselors and arbitrators, not judges. 
The tension over advisory opinions lasted even as personnel 
changed. In 1 788, a different set of judges-Chambers, Hyde, and Sir 
William Jones-again had occasion to reject a request for advice.178 
"Extrajudicial opinions are never given by English Judges but with 
caution, and on such extraordinary emergencies as are out of the 
common course of Law," they explained. 179 Although they acknowledged 
that the members of the SCJ had "thought themselves obliged to give 
such opinions more frequently than is expected from Judges in 
England," they had nonetheless done so only where the alternative 
would have been to await instructions from England and "where danger 
or great inconvenience to the Public must have ensued from such 
delay."180 Otherwise, such advice would be improper. 
The members of the SCJ didn't manage to eliminate advisory 
opinions. Although they were formally independent of the governor-
general and Council, they had a limited appetite for confrontation. 
Nonetheless, their reluctance to advise went beyond what the classical 
common law would have indicated. When the justices wrote in 1788 that 
they gave opinions more frequently than their English counterparts, 
they were measuring themselves against the standard that had 
emerged after Sackuille's Case----one that had effectively eliminated 
judges' advisory duties in England. 
C. United States 
The Jay Court's refusal to issue an advisory opinion in 1793 is 
well known, 181 and this Section will retell that story only briefly. 
Colonial Americans had inherited the classical understanding of 
extrajudicial advice. 182 They recognized its dangers while also accepting 
177. Id. 
178. Impey had left India but had not officially resigned, so that Chambers was acting chief 
justice. Bowyer, supra note 11. Justice Lemaistre had died in 1777. PANDEY, supra note 11, at 41. 
Jones, the newest addition to the court, was a Welsh barrister and polymath with an international 
reputation as an orientalist. Michael J. Franklin, Jones, Sir William, in DNB, supra note 11, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/15105 [https://perma.ccNU3Q-ZW JE]. 
179. Letter from the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature to the Governor-Gen. in Council (Sept. 
11, 1788), in 2 THE LETTERS OF SIR WILLIAM JONES 809, 810 (Garland Cannon ed., 1970). 
180. Id. 
181. See, e.g., CASTO, supra note 36, at 113-21; JAY, supra note 38, at 134-38; Arlyck, supra 
note 37, at 19-23. 
182. See JAY, supra note 38, at 51-56 (discussing examples of colonial governments seeking 
advisory opinions from judges). 
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its legitimacy and utility. 183 This traditional attitude persisted into the 
Constitutional Convention, where some delegates assumed that federal 
judges would continue the English tradition of advising the executive.184 
By 1793, however, many politicians and lawyers had developed 
a sense that advisory opinions might be objectionable. When legal 
questions emerged during the Neutrality Crisis, President Washington 
and his cabinet agreed that it would be proper to ask the Supreme Court 
for advice. But they doubted whether the Justices would acquiesce. The 
President initially asked only for a meeting, not a written opinion.185 
Before transmitting the questions themselves, Secretary of State 
Thomas Jefferson first asked the Justices ''Whether the public may, 
with propriety, be availed of their advice?"186 There is no evidence that 
Jefferson ever sent substantive questions to the Justices; the actual 
correspondence seems to have focused solely on whether it would be 
appropriate to do so. 187 
183. John Adams, for example, saw both sides. On one hand, he quoted Justice Foster's 
warning about the dangers of advisory opinions. John Adams, Letter to the Boston Gazette (Feb. 8, 
1773), in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS: SEPTEMBER 1755 - OCTOBER 1773, at 287, 290 (Robert J. 
Taylor ed., 1977) (quoting FOSTER, supra note 57). On the other hand, he urged colonists to seek 
the "Extrajudicial Opinion" of Massachusetts judges during the Stamp Act crisis. John Adams, 
Entry of Dec. 23, 1765, in 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS: 1755-1770, at 270, 271 
(L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961); see also John Adams, Entry of Dec. 21, 1765, in 1 DIARY AND 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS: 1755-1770, supra, at 270 (outlining his proposed strategy). 
Shortly afterwards, James Otis mocked those judges for being "so squeamish" about delivering 
"extrajudicial opinions." [James Otis], John Hampden to Wm. Pym, Bos. GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., 
Jan. 6, 1766, at 1. (For Otis's authorship, see 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS, supra, 
at 287 n.2.) For more on Adams's strategy, see EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE 
STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION 146-49 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the colonists' 
reaction to the closing of the courts during the Stamp Act crisis); JOSIAH QUlNCY, JR., REPORTS OF 
CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 206 (Samuel M. Quincy ed., Boston, Little, 
Brown, & Co. 1865) (discussing reactions to Adams's argument for a judicial opinion on the validity 
of the Stamp Act); Letter from Francis Bernard to the Bd. of Trade (Mar. 10, 1766), in 3 PAPERS 
OF FRANCIS BERNARD 111, 112 (Colin Nicolson ed., 2013) (describing the opinion of the judges on 
whether to proceed with the opening of the courts in Massachusetts). 
184. JAY, supra note 38, at 75; Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme 
Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 128-30, 145 n.101. 
185. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (July 12, 1793), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789--1800, app. at 744 (Maeva Marcus 
ed., 1998) [hereinafter DHSC); see also Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (July 
18, 1793), in DHSC, supra, app. at 745 ("[Q)uere, would a verbal communication, & explanation of 
the wishes of Government made to them by you be better than by letter?''). 
186. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to U.S. Sup. Ct. JJ. (July 18, 1793), in DHSC, supra note 
185, app. at 747. 
187. Questions to Be Posed to the U.S. Sup. Ct. C.J. & JJ. (July 18, 1793), DHSC, supra note 
185, app. at 747, 751 n.8. 
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In short, Washington and his cabinet seem to have considered 
the propriety of advisory opinions an open question. 188 The response of 
the Justices reinforces this impression. Rather than immediately 
refusing to give advice, four of them-Chief Justice Jay and Justices 
Wilson, Iredell, and Patterson-described the issue as one "of much 
Difficulty as well as Importance."189 They declined to answer without 
consulting the other two members of the Court, Justices Cushing and 
Blair, who were out of town. 190 That meant a three-week delay until 
August, when the Court next met. Although Cushing was still absent 
at that meeting, the other five Justices determined that they were 
unable to oblige the Washington Administration, and they sent their 
famous letter of refusal on August 8. This is its key sentence: 
The Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments of 
Government-their being in certain Respects checks on each other-and our being Judges 
of a court in the last Resort-are Considerations which afford strong arguments against 
the Propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to; especially as 
the Power given by the Constitution to the President of calling on the Heads of 
Departments for opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as expressly limited to 
executive Departments. 191 
The next two Parts will consider the meanmg of that 
consequential passage. 
IV. RECONSIDERING EXISTING EXPLANATIONS 
Between 1 760 and 1793, judges on three continents expressed 
new opposition to advisory opinions. Although no one declared them to 
be categorically forbidden, judges in England and the United States 
effectively ended the practice, and judges in Bengal came close. The 
next two Parts explain why. This Part begins that work by 
reconsidering existing explanations for what happened in the United 
States, as well as their potential application to events in the 
British Empire. 
A. Constitutional 
The orthodox view of the Correspondence focuses on two 
constitutional concerns: that advisory opinions violate the separation of 
188. See Amanda L. Tyler, Assessing the Role of History in the Federal Courts Canon: A Word 
of Caution, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 17 4 7 (2015) (emphasizing the unsettled nature of the 
issue at the Founding). 
189. Letter from John Jay, James Wilson, James Iredell & William Paterson, JJ., U.S. Sup. 
Ct., to George Washington (July 20, 1793), in 6 DHSC, supra note 185, app. at 752. 
190. Id. app. at 753 n.2. 
191. Letter from U.S. Sup. Ct. JJ. to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), supra note 2, at 545. 
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powers and that they are not a proper exercise of the judicial power 
conferred by Article III. Obviously, the U.S. Constitution can't explain 
earlier developments in the British Empire. But one might try to 
salvage this argument by recasting it in more general terms. 
First, let's consider whether an intensified commitment to the 
separation of powers-a commitment reflected in, but not caused by, 
Article III-led judges in Westminster, Calcutta, and Philadelphia to 
reject an advisory role. Even this more general approach turns out to 
be a bad fit. No constitutional revolution preceded the demise of 
advisory opinions in England. 192 Well into the nineteenth century, 
judges continued to swear an oath to advise the king. 193 Meanwhile, 
they continued to engage in activities that would strike us as 
inconsistent with a strong view of separation of powers. For example, 
they continued to draft legislation and to serve in the House of Lords, 
Privy Council, and cabinet. 194 
There was a similar pattern in Bengal. Although the judges 
there resisted advisory opinions, they regularly collaborated with the 
governor-general and Council in other respects, such as by helping to 
draft legislation. 195 Chief Justice lmpey even argued "that a Member of 
the Court [should] always be a Member of the Council."196 
The separation-of-powers approach doesn't even fit the 
American story. As is well known, some of the first Justices served 
simultaneously in the executive branch. 197 It is hard to see why an 
advisory opinion would have offended the separation of powers while 
serving as an ambassador or secretary of state did not. 198 Even more 
striking is evidence from the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which 
192. See JAY, supra note 38, at 6. 
193. See supra note 48. 
194. See LEMMINGS, supra note 58, at 289--91; Kadens, supra note 60, at 156. 
195. See, e.g., Memorandum from Robert Chambers, S.C. Lemaistre & John Hyde (Mar. 30, 
1776), IOR H/124, at 427 (on file with the British Library); Letter from Elijah Impey to Edward 
Thurlow (Mar. 3, 1776), Add. Ms. 16259, at 26 (on file with the British Library). 
196. Letter from Elijah Impey to Lord North (Oct. 19, 1776), Add. Ms. 16266, at 31v (on file 
with the British Library); see also CURLEY, supra note 12, at 262 (describing Chambers's ambition 
to get a council seat). 
197. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
1789-1815, at 413-14 (2009); Wheeler, supra note 184. 
198. See infra notes 213-214 and accompanying text. In 1803, St. George Tucker complained 
that the Chief Justices' simultaneous employment as foreign envoys was "in manifest violation of 
every constitutional principle." 1 ST. GEORGE TuCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES 
OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES; AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. at 356 n.* (Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803). 
Interestingly, he also thought that federal judges had been less scrupulous about the separation of 
powers than their English counterparts in this respect. In his view, the Constitution protected 
judges' independence, but it made no significant innovation in separating judges from the 
executive. Id. app. at 356-57. 
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has been said to exemplify Founding-era ideas about the separation of 
powers. 199 That document required judges to give advisory opinions.200 
There is one piece of evidence that has made "separation of 
powers" seem plausible: the Justices' invocation of the "Lines of 
Separation drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments 
of Government."201 But, as others have observed, that statement merely 
indicated the Justices' power to say no-not their inability to say yes.202 
Their reference to the Opinion Clause served a similar purpose. 203 The 
Constitution's text and structure, the Justices were saying, had created 
a judiciary that was independent of the president. 204 But "independent" 
does not entail "unable to help." 
Shifting the focus from separation of powers to judicial 
independence also helps to make sense of events in England and India. 
The SCJ, which had been chartered by the Crown, was meant to be 
independent of the Company-controlled Council. Its justices understood 
that, and they expressly grounded their refusal to advise in their not 
being subject to its jurisdiction.205 English judges lacked that degree of 
formal autonomy, but they arguably enjoyed an even greater degree of 
functional independence. Starting with the Glorious Revolution in 
1688, judges had acquired increasingly strong protections against 
removal.206 In 1761, Parliament closed a loophole that had allowed 
judges to be replaced upon the death of the monarch. 207 Importantly, 
George III had recommended that change shortly after his accession, 
offering a strong signal that the Crown itself supported the 
independence of judges. 208 Additionally, the judges of Westminster Hall, 
199. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 
434 (2d ed. 1998); Barbara Aronstein Black, Who Judges? Who Cares? History Now and Then, 36 
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 749, 795 (2010). 
200. MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 3, art. 2, amended by MASS. CONST. art. 75; see infra Appendix 
(describing requirements for advisory opinions). 
201. Letter from U.S. Sup. Ct. JJ. to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), supra note 2, at 545. 
202. CASTO, supra note 36, at 113. 
203. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 64 7, 656--
57 (1996). 
204. Frankfurter, supra note 29, at 4 79, 483. This is not to say that the Justices' understanding 
was identical to modern theories of judicial independence. Cf. Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and 
Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 467-71 (2018) (showing the historical 
contingency of several rules we associate today with judicial independence). 
205. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
206. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON 
LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 656 (2009); Daniel M. 
Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth 
Century England, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 3, 6 (2005). 
207. Commissions and Salaries of Judges Act 1760, 1 Geo. 3, c. 23, s. I. 
208. Contemporaries disagreed about the practical importance of the Act. Compare 1 HORACE 
WALPOLE, MEMOIRS OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE THE THIRD 35 (Denis Le Marchant ed., 
Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard 1845) (describing the statute as a "trifling addition" to judges' 
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unlike their counterparts in Bengal, could rely on the close supervision 
by Parliament and the press to support their claims to autonomy. 209 
Judicial independence was a necessary precondition for the decline of 
advisory opinions. But the ability to say no is not the same as a duty to 
do so. 
That leaves the second constitutional objection: that 
extrajudicial opinions are, as the term suggests, not an exercise of the 
judicial power granted by Article III. The statement is true but 
tautological. As William Baude and others have explained, the judicial 
power is a court's "power to issue binding judgments."210 By definition, 
extrajudicial opinions didn't invoke that power. Indeed, they weren't 
issued by a court at all, but by the subscribing judges.211 The question, 
then, is not whether advisory opinions abuse the Article III power but 
whether the Constitution prohibits judges from engaging in additional 
activities. But as we've just seen, common-law judges sustained various 
extrajudicial activities after advisory opinions ceased. 
B. Prudential 
Sensing the weakness of the constitutional case, some scholars 
have described the Correspondence as a prudential response to the 
practical disadvantages of advisory opinions. In particular, Professors 
Golove and Hulsebosch have argued that the Justices sought to enhance 
their international credibility by emphasizing their separation from the 
executive branch. 
This argument rightly focuses on the potential audience of 
advisory opinions.212 And it seems clear that the Justices often acted 
already-secure tenure), with 1 JAMES BOSWELL, BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON 587 (H. Milford ed., 
Oxford University Press 1924) (reporting Johnson's criticism of the Act as overly protective of 
judges). See also EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 79 (1944) (arguing for the 
importance of the Act). 
209. David Lemmings has argued that judicial independence remained imperfect in the 
eighteenth century. Judicial salaries were often in arrears, which gave the Treasury some leverage 
over them; post-retirement pensions remained discretionary until 1799; and the executive could 
offer peerages and other douceurs to judges and their families. Moreover, between 1714 and 1760, 
Britain effectively had one-party rule, and the appointment process tended to produce judges who 
were sympathetic to the dominant Whig regime. LEMMINGS, supra note 58, at 271-74. But the 
intensification of partisan conflict after 1760 would have mitigated these concerns: any effort to 
compromise judges' independence would have provoked an immediate backlash from the 
opposition. Id. at 282-86. 
210. William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1809 (2007); accord Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995). 
211. See TOPF, supra note 18, at xiv-xv (distinguishing between requests made to a state 
supreme court and those made to the Justices of the Court); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, Advisory 
Opinions, in LEGAL ESSAYS 42, 49 (Ezra Ripley Thayer ed.,1908) (noting that advisory opinions in 
Massachusetts were not binding). 
212. See infra Section V.B (discussing potential misuses of advisory opinions). 
656 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3:621 
with an eye toward foreign observers. But there are at least two reasons 
to doubt that the Correspondence was primarily aimed abroad. First, 
this theory hits the same stumbling block as the traditional separation-
of-powers approach: the repeated tendency of Chief Justices to serve in 
the executive branch-and, specifically, to serve as diplomats. Most 
strikingly, Chief Justice Jay accepted an appointment as envoy to Great 
Britain less than a year after he signed the Correspondence.213 His two 
immediate successors also took significant public roles in foreign 
affairs. 214 If refusing to issue an advisory opinion was a way to tell the 
world that the judiciary and the executive were unconnected, the Chief 
Justice and his successors muddled the message. 
Second, it's not clear that foreign observers would have cared.215 
Consider Britain's own experience with a neutrality dispute-the so-
called Silesian loan affair, which involved its seizure of neutral 
Prussian ships during the War of the Austrian Succession. 216 During 
that crisis, the British government had its law officers prepare a report 
on Britain's view of applicable international law. 217 The report-which 
had been commissioned to fortify Britain's credibility among European 
diplomats218-"acquired a great reputation and is looked upon as one of 
the most important international documents of the 18th century."219 Its 
213. John Jay: Appointment as Chief Justice in 1789, in 1 DHSC, supra note 185, at 3, 7; 
Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 34, at 1042. He had also continued as Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs for his first six months on the bench. John Jay: Appointment as Chief Justice in 1789, 
supra, at 3, 6. 
214. Chief Justice Rutledge was a recess appointee who was denied Senate confirmation after 
he publicly denounced the Jay Treaty. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 90--95 (1995). 
Rutledge's replacement, Oliver Ellsworth, served overseas as a diplomat while Chief Justice. 
Thomas H. Lee, The Law of Nations and the Judicial Branch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1707, 1741 (2018); 
Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1745 & n.174 (1998). 
215. When Jefferson told the French minister, Edmond Charles Genet, that federal courts 
would need to adjudicate certain matters in dispute between the two countries, he replied that he 
was "ignorant ... of the constitutional judges" to whom Jefferson referred. Letter from Edmond 
Charles Genet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France, to Thomas Jefferson, Sec'y of 
State (June 22, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 155, 156 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair 
Clarke eds., Washington, D.C., Gales & Seaton 1833); cf. JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: 
NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 97 (2001) (describing Genet as "confused" by U.S. 
constitutional law). 
216. See SHAVANA MUSA, VICTIM REPARATION UNDER THE Ius POST BELLUM: AN HISTORICAL 
AND NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE 74-85 (2018). 
217. GEORGE LEE, G. PAUL, DUDLEY RYDER & WILLIAM MURPHY, REPORT OF THE LAW 
OFFICERS OF THE CROWN (Jan. 18, 1753), reprinted in ERNEST SATOW, THE SILESIAN LoAN AND 
FREDERICK THE GREAT 77, 77-100 (1915). 
218. See J. LL. J. EDWARDS, THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN 134 (1964) (noting that the 
opinion was "communicated ... to the British Ministers in the leading European capitals for 
presentation to the courts in which they were accredited"); SATOW, supra note 217, at 73. 
219. Arnold D. McNair, The Debt of International Law in Britain to the Civil Law and the 
Civilians, 39 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS Soc'y 183, 195 (1953). 
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admirers included Vattel, Montesquieu, Alexander Hamilton, and 
Edmund Randolph.220 Nobody seems to have cared that most of its 
authors were executive officers.221 In fact, as Golove and Hulsebosch 
observe elsewhere, a close association between the Justices and the 
executive branch might actually have enhanced the Court's credibility. 
In 1790, when a senator wanted to reassure a British diplomat that 
Chief Justice Jay would treat foreign litigants fairly, he elided the 
distinction between Jay's political and judicial roles: "[I]s it possible to 
suppose, that what he openly acknowledged in his political character, 
will not equally affect his decisions on the Bench?"222 
C. Political 
This leaves explanations that emphasize the Justices' domestic 
political priorities. Professors Arlyck, Casto, and Jay, for example, all 
see the Justices as trying to steer clear of the contentious field of foreign 
relations-whether to save themselves political trouble, to boost 
the presidency as an institution, or to encourage the President's 
Federalist policies. 
As with the other two explanations, this one hits on an 
important truth. Eighteenth-century judges worried that executive 
officials might use advisory opinions to dodge political accountability. 
lmpey justified the judges' refusal to answer one inquiry by explaining 
that an advisory opinion would "in some measure remove the 
responsibility ... to ourselves."223 Chancellor Robert Livingston of New 
York used more colorful language in 1801. Advisory opinions, he 
warned, would "convert Lludges] into mantelets to receive the shot, 
220. See, e.g., HENRY J. B0URGUIGN0N, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL.APPELLATE 
PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-1787, at 181-82 (1977); EMER DE VATTEL, THE 
LAW OF NATIONS 304 n.* (Bela Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758); 
Alexander Hamilton, To Defence No. XX [New York, Oct. 23 and 24, 1795], in 19 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JULY 1795-DECEMBER 1975, at 329, 342-43 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973); 
Letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 12, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 537, 538 (John Catanzariti ed., 1992). 
221. The authors were Sir George Lee, the Dean of the Arches; George Paul, the King's 
Advocate; Attorney General Dudley Ryder; and Solicitor General William Murray. Of these, only 
Lee was a judge. (He presided over the ecclesiastical court of the Archbishop of Canterbury.) 
222. Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 34, at 1015 (quoting Letter from Lord Dorchester to Mr. 
Grenville (May 27, 1790)). One might also cite the example of prize cases, "which were among the 
most numerous and important types of cases raising questions under the law of nations at the 
time." Id. at 1003. In Britain, prize appeals were decided by the Lords Commissioners for Prize 
Appeals, a majority of whom had to be members of the Privy Council-a fundamentally executive 
body. See BOURGUIGN0N, supra note 220, at 18, 161-77; supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. 
223. Letter from Elijah Impey to Lord Bathurst (Oct. 19, 1776), Add. Ms. 16266, at 32v (on file 
with the British Library). 
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while the leaders of parties fought securely under their protection."224 
This concern became more salient in the later eighteenth century. The 
three places where we've seen judges resist advisory opinions-England 
in the 1760s, Bengal in the 1770s, and the United States in the 1790s-
were all sites of intense partisan conflict, where judges would have been 
especially attuned to questions of political responsibility. 
Where these accounts fall short, however, is in not accounting 
for the risks of refusing to advise. 225 In the late eighteenth century, 
extrajudicial silence wasn't always the safer course. George II became 
enraged when he thought Mansfield was trying to dodge his advisory 
duties in Sackville's Case.226 Indeed, the Duke of Newcastle was 
convinced that the incident would lead to his friend's downfall. 227 
Throughout his career, Mansfield was criticized because of his supposed 
proclivity for saying in private what he refused to say in public. 228 In 
contrast, the unanimous opm10n in Sackville's Case proved 
uncontroversial, as did most advisory opinions. If a judge's goal was to 
stay out of trouble, joining a unanimous opinion was the surer path.229 
Impey got even more grief for his reluctance. In 1786, he faced 
impeachment on various charges of misconduct as chief justice. The 
third article cited his refusal to give an advisory opinion on "the Limits 
of the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court."230 Impey, the article charged, 
not only "did decline giving any satisfactory Answer," but "did persuade 
the other Judges to declare, in Conjunction with himself, that they had 
no Authority to make, extrajudicially, any particular Description of the 
Powers of the Court, other than is given in the Charter of their 
Establishment."231 This charge was quickly dropped (and Impey was 
eventually acquitted on all counts), but its inclusion suggests that his 
extrajudicial silence had been costly. Impey himself seems to have 
anticipated this. A decade earlier, he had responded to the SCJ's critics 
224. Letter from Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, Governor of New York (Mar. 21, 1801), in 
2 STATE OF NEW YORK: MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNORS 481, 482 (Charles Z. Lincoln ed., 1909). 
225. For additional critiques, see Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 34, at 1027 n.360. 
226. See supra notes 102, 116-118 and accompanying text. 
227. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to [Andrew] Stone, supra note 116, at 10 (''I see a Run 
coming on upon [Mansfield] for preventing (as they think) the asking the opinion of the Judges, 
some time ago .... I foresee such a storm as no man can stand."). 
228. See, e.g., Letter from "Junius" to Lord Mansfield (Nov. 14, 1770), in THE LETTERS OF 
JUNIUS 206, 215 (John Cannon ed., 1978) [hereinafter JUNIUS]. Interestingly, the "Junius" letters 
were likely written by Philip Francis. See John Cannon, Appendix Eight: A Note on Authorship, in 
JUNIUS, supra, at 539. 
229. The opinion in Sackville's Case repeated a conclusion already reached by the Attorney 
and Solicitor General. See supra note 106. 
230. ARTICLES OF CHARGE OF HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS, AGAINST SIR ELIJAH IMPEY 
108 (Dublin, John Stockdale 1788). 
231. Id. 
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by emphasizing that its justices "have given extrajudicial opinions at 
the desire of the Governor and Council."232 His defenders likewise 
praised his willingness to write advisory opinions. 233 They did 
not mention that he had rendered those opinions infrequently and 
under protest. 
The Correspondence was far less controversial, but that might 
not have been clear in advance. Some contemporaries thought that the 
president was "authorized to require in writing" "the opinion of the 
judges," including on questions about "the laws of nations."234 As 
Professor Jay observes, the early Supreme Court was not universally 
loved, and it would have been plausible for its critics to attack it for 
failing to assist President Washington. 
Thus, "political" explanations of the Correspondence are right to 
focus on questions of accountability. Advisory opinions were indeed 
risky, and they could be used to shift responsibility from policymakers 
to judges. But silence wasn't safe, either. Something beyond risk 
aversion must have pushed judges to end their advisory practice. 
V. COMPLETING THE STORY 
The last Part showed that existing accounts can't fully explain 
the Correspondence or the decline of advisory opinions more generally. 
This Part develops a new explanation, which focuses on changes within 
the common law. 
The classical attitude toward advisory opinions had depended on 
a jurisprudence that treated all legal opinions as probative, but none as 
decisive, in determining the law's meaning.235 Starting in the 1750s, 
that view of legal authority came under pressure. The declaratory 
232. Letter from Elijah Impey to Lord Weymouth (Jan. 20, 1776), Add. Ms. 38398, at 220, 240v 
(on file with the British Library). 
233. See, e.g., Letter from Warren Hastings to Lord North (Jan. 20, 1776), in 2 HASTINGS 
MEMOIRS, supra note 132, at 14; Considerations on East India Affairs, ([after 1774]), Add. Ms. 
38398, at 107, 113 (on file with the British Library): 
The Establishment of the Court of Judicature in Bengal has done some good, & some 
mischief. The good it has done in some particular Instances makes me think it should 
be continued; ... It has in two Instances wisely upon application interposed with its 
advice, & thereby prevented great confusion in two of the Settlements. 
234. "A Native American," Letter to the Editor, CITY GAZETTE & DAILY ADVERTISER 
(Charleston, S.C.), Sept. 16, 1793, at 2; see also 11 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 4, 1789-MARCH 3, 1791, at 927, 931 (June 17, 
1789) (statement of Rep. Gerry) (''There is a clause in this system of government ... which 
authorises the president to obtain the opinions of the heads of departments in writing; so the 
president and senate may require the opinion of the judges respecting this power if they have any 
doubts concerning it."). These arguments seem absurd today-they cite the Opinion Clause in 
support of advisory opinions-but that doesn't mean that they might not have caused trouble. 
235. See supra Section II.A. 
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theory remained orthodox, but it began to fragment. Some judges, most 
prominently Blackstone, began to elevate the authority of individual 
cases into a newly powerful theory of stare decisis; others, most notably 
Mansfield, tended to emphasize cases' underlying principles. Those 
subtle differences in emphasis created new anxiety about the nature of 
legal authority. As judges and lawyers realized their disagreement, 
they tried to develop clearer rules about what counted as evidence of 
the law. 
Advisory opinions were a casualty of this process. There was 
little doubt that a judge's extrajudicial writings ought to carry less 
weight than the opinion accompanying a judgment. But it was difficult 
to say how much less when the profession couldn't agree about how to 
treat judgments themselves. Judges began to worry that their advisory 
pronouncements would be misused in ways that might harm both the 
development of the law and their own reputations. In response to these 
concerns, judges intensified their long-standing caution about issuing 
advisory opinions, until the practice died out entirely. 
A. The Problem of Legal Authority 
The common law experienced a crisis in the middle of the 
eighteenth century.236 Britain's rapid economic growth led many 
observers to conclude that English law was unfit for a modern 
commercial society,237 a suspicion reinforced by litigants' flight from the 
courts.238 Judges and lay observers lamented the law's uncertainty, 
while a surge of parliamentary activity raised new questions about the 
roles of courts and legislators in reforming the law. 239 Meanwhile, 
Britain's imperial expansion created new stages on which to display the 
inadequacies of English law.240 
236. LEMMINGS, supra note 58, at 144. 
237. See, e.g., David Lieberman, Property, Commerce, and the Common Law: Attitudes to Legal 
Change in the Eighteenth Century, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 144 (John 
Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995); David Lieberman, The Legal Needs of a Commercial Society: 
The Jurisprudence of Lord Kames, in WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE SHAPING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 203, 205-06 (Istvan Hont & Michael lgnatieff eds., 1986). 
238. See C.W. Brooks, Interpersonal Conflict and Social Tension: Civil Litigation in England, 
1640-1830, in THE FIRST MODERN SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN ENGLISH HISTORY IN HONOUR OF LA WREN CE 
STONE 357, 359 (A.L. Beier, David Cannadine & James M. Rosenheim eds., 2005); Christian R. 
Burset, Arbitrating the England Problem: Litigation, Private Ordering, and the Rise of the Modern 
Economy, 36 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561136 
[https://perma.cc/6JRF-V6AN]. 
239. DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 11-30 (1989). 
240. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, Place and Time {l 782}, in SELECTED WRITINGS 152 (Stephen 
G. Engelmann ed., 2011). 
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One response to this crisis was increased attention to the nature 
of legal authority. Perhaps the most prominent examples of this were 
found in the competing approaches of Blackstone and Mansfield. 
Blackstone argued for "a relatively new and stronger understanding of 
the binding nature of precedent."241 In his account of the common law, 
judges swore oaths to decide cases according to law, not their own 
discretion. Because that law was knowable through precedents, they 
bound judges in later cases. Mansfield, in contrast, took a more relaxed 
approach to case law. Precedents, in his view, were authoritative not 
because they provided specific rules that judges must follow, but 
because they revealed the law's underlying principles. A judge's job was 
to conform his decision to those principles-not the specific rules of 
particular cases. Therefore, a judge could overrule cases that had been 
decided wrongly or had aged poorly.242 
The difference between these two approaches was subtle. 
Occasionally, the jurisprudential gap between Blackstone and 
Mansfield erupted conspicuously.243 Usually, though, it lurked below 
the surface. Both judges embraced a variant of the declaratory theory, 
and it wasn't obvious whose approach best represented contemporary 
orthodoxy.244 The result was a legal system in which the participants 
disagreed about the nature of precedent but were not always able to 
articulate how or why.245 
This sometimes-silent disagreement about case law had 
collateral consequences for other kinds of legal authority. Blackstone 
had identified as evidence of the common law not only prior cases but 
also "the authoritative writings of the venerable sages of the law," 
which have "intrinsic authority in the courts ofjustice."246 But how were 
such writings to be weighed against judicial decisions, or against each 
other? Jeremy Bentham, writing in the 1770s, mocked the absence of 
any "common scale": "Every man, pleader or judge, makes up for himself 
fragments of such a scale, pro re nata, as it happens: and whether in 
241. Kadens, supra note 51, at 1558. 
242. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 239, at 86-87. 
243. See Burset, supra note 91 (discussing the controversy surrounding Perrin v. Blake). 
244. See, e.g., LIEBERMAN, supra note 239, at 3; MICHAEL LoBBAN, THE COMMON LAW AND 
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 1760-1850, at 98-114 (1991); Kadens, supra note 51, at 1556 & n.12. 
245. Cf. Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. 
REV. 529, 530-31 (1991) (describing a similar phenomenon in twentieth-century doctrines of 
personal jurisdiction). 
246. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *72-73. 
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any case that of the pleader shall happen to be the same with that of 
the Judge is a matter of [chance]."247 
Bentham wasn't alone in recognizing this problem. Some judges 
responded to it by developing a norm (frequently but erroneously 
attributed to the nineteenth century248) against citing living authors. 
Bentham himself suggested that such a convention was emerging in his 
own day. 249 Mansfield had invoked it a few years earlier, when he 
blocked a barrister from citing Blackstone's Commentaries because 
their author lived.250 Blackstone himself drew the line not between 
living and dead but between ancient and modern. 251 But these 
guidelines remained flexible and contested; 252 it is revealing not only 
that Mansfield refused to hear the Commentaries cited but also that a 
barrister had considered them citable.253 (The barrister, incidentally, 
was Elijah Impey. 2s4) 
Judges also tried to develop a scale for weighing opinions of 
counsel. Traditionally, the opinions of eminent lawyers had enjoyed 
247. JEREMY BENTHAM, A Comment on the Commentaries, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM: A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 1, 210 
(J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977). 
248. See Alexandra Braun, Burying the Living? The Citation of Legal Writings in English 
Courts, 58 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 27, 33 (2010) (arguing that the rule emerged at least by the early 
nineteenth century); Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Judges and Professors-Ships Passing in the 
Night?, 77 RABEL J. COMPAR. & INT'L PRlV. L. 233, 235 (2013). This rule is sometimes referred to 
as ''better read when dead." DUXBURY, supra note 62, at 78. (A warning, perhaps, to professors 
who thirst to be cited.) 
249. BENTHAM, supra note 247, at 211. 
250. Postscript, LoNDON EVENING POST, May 15-17, 1770, at 4 (reporting Mansfield's 
statement that "he would suffer no such references in that Court; for though the work alluded to 
was of much utility to the public, and would be remembered and applied to, when the author was 
no more, yet, while living, he thought it unnecessary, as well as improper"). Awkwardly, 
Blackstone was on the bench at the time. Id. 
251. See BENTHAM, supra note 247, at 209-10; see also JOHN DALRYMPLE, AN ESSAY TOWARDS 
A GENERAL HISTORY OF FEUDAL PROPERTY IN GREAT BRITAIN, at xi (London, A. Millar 4th ed. 1759) 
(explaining why he quoted "some modern writers ... who may perhaps not be quoted as 
authorities in courts of law''). Mansfield also seems to have been skeptical of the newly departed. 
In 1774, when a barrister cited Vattel (d. 1767), Mansfield asked, "Does he quote any 
authorities?"-suggesting that while the Swiss jurist was citable, he was not an "authority'' 
himself. Campbell v. Hall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 848, 879; Lofft. 655, 710 (K.B.). 
252. James Ram's influential treatise found it "difficult, in some cases, to draw the line of 
partition between books that are, and books that are not, authority." Ram thought the key question 
was whether the author was a judge. JAMES RAM, THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL JUDGMENT 92-93 
(London, A. Maxwell 1834). 
253. See, e.g., Kadens, supra note 60, at 164-65 (describing citations of modern authors at oral 
argument and in jury instructions); cf. DAWSON, supra note 47, at 97 (describing the rule against 
citing living authors as "only a rule of etiquette''). Francis Hargrave suggested that he cited 
Blackstone's Commentaries to Mansfield in Somerset's Case (1772), but he also admits that the 
printed report of his argument was "entirely a written composition" created for publication, so its 
accuracy is questionable. The Case of James Sommersett, in 20 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE 
TRIALS, 1771-1777, supra note 166, at 1, 23 n.*, 28. 
254. Postscript, supra note 250, at 4. 
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significant authority, but only as evidence of what the profession 
thought. 255 Over the course of the eighteenth century, however, judges 
and lawyers increasingly cited individual opinions as authoritative in 
themselves. 256 In 1749, for example, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke 
described an opinion that he had coauthored while attorney general 
(known as the Yorke-Talbot opinion) as having settled certain questions 
about the legal status of slavery.257 Hardwicke's self-citation reflected a 
growing tendency to treat the opinions of eminent lawyers as 
potentially decisive.258 But, as with treatises, the weight of such 
opinions was contested.259 When counsel cited the Yorke-Talbot opinion 
to Mansfield in 1772, he discounted its authority because it had been 
given "in Lincoln's Inn Hall after dinner."260 Maybe Yorke and Talbot 
had too much to drink when they declared slavery compatible with 
English law.261 
Two years later, Mansfield offered a more systematic treatment 
of lawyers' opinions in Campbell v. Hall.262 At argument, Francis 
Hargrave cited an opinion given in 1689 by Sir John Somers and Sir 
George Treby. Mansfield asked whether the case had been referred to 
them in their official capacities as attorney and solicitor general-
implying that an official opinion might carry more weight. 263 But his 
opinion ultimately declined to pursue that distinction. Instead, he 
stated that "opinions of counsel, whether acting officially in a public 
charge or in private, are not properly authority to found a decision," but 
merely evidence of what lawyers at the time had thought. 264 But not 
255. See BAKER, supra note 59, at 87-89. 
256. Sir John Baker has observed that in the eighteenth century, it ''became a common practice 
for opinions [of counsel) to be transcribed into volumes for future reference," although historians 
have yet to explain why. Id. at 88. 
257. Pearne v. Lisle (1749) 27 Eng. Rep. 47, 48; Amb. 75, 76-77. 
258. American land speculators famously cited a "garbled version" of another opinion to justify 
land purchases from "Indians," even though a royal proclamation had barred such transactions. 
(The opinion's authors had been writing about South Asians, not Native Americans.) STUART 
BANNER, How THE INDIANS LoST THEIR LAND 101-03 (2005); JACK M. SOSIN, WHITEHALL AND THE 
WILDERNESS: THE MIDDLE WEST IN BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1760-1775, at 230-34, 259-
67 (1961). 
259. See, e.g., RAM, supra note 252, at 93--94 (quoting with approval Justice Huller's 
declaration that "opinions given by eminent men at the bar ... have no weight in the scale of 
justice," but noting instances in which judges cited or relied on such opinions). 
260. Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 503; Lofft. 1, 8. 
261. Cf. 2 FRANCIS MASERES, THE CANADIAN FREEHOLDER 297-99 (London, B. White 1779) 
(critiquing another opinion by Yorke as "given very hastily and with very little attention"). 
262. Campbell v. Hall (1774), in 20 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, 1771-1777, 
supra note 166, at 239. 
263. Id. at 300 ("Is it referred to them as officers of the crown?''). 
264. Id. at 326 (emphasis added). Later, Mansfield hinted that judicial dicta might outweigh 
opinions of counsel. See id. at 344 ("[N]o book, no saying of a judge, no not even an opinion of any 
counsel public or private, has been cited .... "). 
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everyone agreed. Several decades later, the lawyer and imperial 
bureaucrat George Chalmers described the opinions of the Crown's law 
officers as "of little less authority, than decided law."265 
One reason that treatises and opinions of counsel were so 
attractive to cite was their textual reliability. Eighteenth-century law 
reporting was messy. Judges did not send their opinions to the printer. 
Instead, they pronounced their decisions from the bench; what made it 
into print depended on what reporters happened to write down. 266 The 
quality of those reports varied widely.267 "At present, I am always 
uncertain whether what is printed be a faithful report or not," one 
pamphleteer complained; "it comes with no authority, but from some 
private hand."268 In response, Mansfield tapped James Burrow as the 
first authorized reporter of King's Bench decisions. But even Burrow 
provided only paraphrases of what judges said. 269 As a result, lawyers 
remained hungry for judges' actual words, even if they came from 
questionable sources. One prominent law reporter noted that "Mr. 
Baron Maseres has told me" that Justice Willes had disagreed with 
Mansfield's opinion in Campbell.270 The dissent wasn't noted in other 
reports, and this game of telephone was the only indication in print that 
the decision hadn't been unanimous.271 
Unlike judicial decisions, treatises and opinions of counsel came 
straight from their authors' pens. John Reeves, a barrister and colonial 
judge, acknowledged that the "opinions of law-officers" lacked the 
265. GEORGE CHALMERS, OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS, ON VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH 
JURISPRUDENCE, at xxi-xxii (London, Reed & Hunter 1814); see also Alexander Du Toit, Chalmers, 
George, in DNB, supra note 11, https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/5028 [https://perma.ccN5AP-
WJNJ] (outlining Chalmers's life as a lawyer and English bureaucrat). 
266. Tiersma, supra note 60, at 1200---01; see also Maeva Marcus, Wilson as a Justice, 17 GEO. 
J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 147, 158 (2019) (noting that federal courts were not required to issue written 
opinions in the 1790s). 
267. See T.T. Arvind & Christian R. Burset, A New Report of En tick v. Carrington (1765), 110 
KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 18-28), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3529420 
[https://perma.cc/SBZ3-CUJQ] (discussing differences between the various reports of an 
eighteenth-century case). 
268. ANOTHER LETTER TO MR. ALMON, IN MATTER OF LIBEL 147 (London, J. Almon 2d ed. 
1771); see also Francis Hargrave, Preface, in 1 COLLECTANEA JURIDICA: CONSISTING OF TRACTS 
RELATIVE TO THE LAW AND CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND, at A2 (Francis Hargrave ed., London, E. 
& R. Brooke 1791) ("[I]t must necessarily happen under the present want of regulation for an 
authentic and a continued publication of the Adjudications of our Courts of Law, that many 
important authorities will be left to float on the uncertain surface of tradition .... "). 
269. DAWSON, supra note 47, at 79. Unlike some reporters at the time, Burrow didn't know 
shorthand. Id. And even eighteenth-century shorthand systems "did not allow reporters to capture 
verbatim text." See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON'S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 23-24 (2015). 
270. Addenda-The Case of the Island of Grenada (Campbell v. Hall), in 20 A COMPLETE 
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, 1771-1777, supra note 166, at 1387, 1389. 
271. See Campbell v. Hall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045; 1 Cowp. 204 (containing no mention of 
any dissenting opinions). 
2021) ADVISORY OPINIONS & LEGAL AUTHORITY 665 
"juridical authority" of "opinions delivered by judges upon the bench."272 
Nonetheless, he chose to rely on them in his well-regarded treatise on 
navigation laws. "[T]he opinions of lawyers have an advantage which 
[judicial opinions] have not," he explained; "they come down to us in the 
writing of the author ... the opinions of courts, on the other hand, are 
usually conveyed by standers-by."273 Advisory opinions had the same 
advantage-with the added benefit of having been given by the very 
"oracles which speak in our courts."274 
There was another reason that advisory opinions were so 
alluring. Unlike ordinary cases, which were heard by the four members 
of a single court, advisory opinions were generally signed by all twelve 
common-law judges, which made the final product look enticingly 
authoritative. We can appreciate the effect of all those signatures by 
considering the phenomenon of twelve-judge decisions-an informal 
process of appellate review in which the judges of King's Bench, 
Common Pleas, and Exchequer consulted on difficult cases. Technically, 
twelve-judge deliberations were extrajudicial, and they served merely 
to advise the judge or judges who were actually hearing the case. 
Nonetheless, as James Oldham has shown, the resulting opinions "were 
at times considered to be weightier than decisions by only one of the 
common law courts."275 At times. Foster v. Thackary (1781) provides an 
extreme example of the uncertainty this might cause. That case "was 
never finally decided and was never made public," but counsel later 
cited it as precedent. 276 Justice Buller also cited it as "a case of 
considerable authority"; but he wrote in dissent, so his colleagues 
presumably disagreed.277 
In short, conditions were ideal for advisory opinions to be used 
in ways that their authors did not intend. Inadequate law reporting 
encouraged lawyers to seize on authentic texts, even if they had less 
authority than judicial opinions. The fragmentation of the declaratory 
theory meant that practitioners and judges disagreed about how much 
weight to give those second-tier texts. Bentham's sneering description 
of "the whole affair of authority" as plunged into "glorious uncertainty" 
272. JOHN REEVES, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF SHIPPING AND NAVIGATION 9 (London, E. & R. 
Brooke 1792). 
273. Id. at 9-10. 
274. See id. at 9. 
275. Oldham, supra note 25, at 193-94 (emphasis added). 
276. Id. at 196. 
277. Good v. Elliott (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 808, 812; 3 T.R. 693, 702 (Buller, J., dissenting). 
These considerations also explain why dicta survived even as advisory opinions declined. First, 
everyone understood that dicta in a law report weren't the judge's actual words; they were, in a 
very real sense, the words of a reporter. See Tiersma, supra note 60, at 1208. Second, dicta were 
usually attributed to a single judge. 
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was unusually caustic but not inaccurate.278 The situation would have 
been even more confusing for lay readers, who often failed to appreciate 
the nuances of contemporary jurisprudence.279 Judges responded to this 
environment by trying to curtail their advisory activities. 
B. Rethinking the Refusals 
Advisory opinions had worked when everyone agreed what they 
signified. By the 1760s, however, a judge who signed onto such an 
opinion had to worry that readers might put it to very different uses 
from what had been intended. And the stakes of misuse were growing. 
Although Britain had experienced political conflict throughout the 
eighteenth century, partisan divisions reached a new pitch in the 
1760s.280 During that time, judging came to be viewed not merely as 
political but as partisan, 281 and writers more frequently attributed 
jurisprudential disagreements to judges' bad faith. 282 In that context, 
judges had less reason to believe that their advisory opinions would be 
given the provisional meaning that the classical common law had 
accorded them. In response, judges intensified their long-standing 
reluctance to give formal extrajudicial advice. 
There were two concerns. The first was that a judge's 
adversaries might use an old opinion to embarrass him. Classical 
advisory opinions had insisted on judges' right to change their minds. 
In Sackville's Case, for example, the judges concluded by laying "in our 
claim not to be bound by this answer."283 But judges had reason to doubt 
that readers would honor that claim. In 1767, for example, the Duke of 
278. BENTHAM, supra note 247, at 211. Incidentally, the ironical phrase "the glorious 
uncertainty of the law" appears to have been coined in 1756. Glorious, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
279. Cf. HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE, LAW MISCELLANIES 53 (Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1814) 
("The public opinion is that the courts are governed by decisions as if these made the law .... It 
ought not to be so ... and it is a great matter that it be understood by the people .... "). 
280. See, e.g., JOHN BREWER, PARTY IDEOLOGY AND POPULAR POLITICS AT THE ACCESSION OF 
GEORGE III, at 9 (1976); JUSTIN DU RIVAGE, REVOLUTION AGAINST EMPIRE: TAXES, POLITICS, AND 
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 180 (2017) (describing the polarization of North 
American political culture in the 1760s); JAMES M. VAUGHN, THE POLITICS OF EMPIRE AT THE 
ACCESSION OF GEORGE III: THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND THE CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION OF 
BRITAIN'S IMPERIAL STATE 71-72 (2019) (describing the rise of the radical Whig party in the 1760s). 
281. During the reign of George II, judicial appointments had been controlled by a Whig 
oligarchy. After the accession of George III in 1760, the instability of party politics led to greater 
political diversity among judicial appointees-and a heightened potential for political conflict 
among them. See LEMMINGS, supra note 58, at 285--88. 
282. See, e.g., John Brewer, The Wilkites and the Law, 1763-74: A Study of Radical Notions of 
Governance, in AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE: THE ENGLISH AND THEIR LAW IN THE SEVENTEENTH 
AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 128 (John Brewer & John Styles eds., 1980). 
283. Supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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Newcastle plotted to publicize an eight-year-old opinion that his 
political rival, Lord Camden, had given when he was attorney general. 
The old opinion contradicted the position Camden now sought to 
advance in Parliament, and Newcastle assumed that Camden would 
"have a Difficulty" opposing "a Point, which he has himself, in a formal 
Report, declared."284 Newcastle bragged about this tactic to his friend 
Mansfield, who perhaps wondered whether he had any inconvenient 
past opinions of his own. 285 Newcastle should have understood that law 
officers sometimes wrote things in their official capacities that might 
not fully comport with their private views. 286 But if politicians refused 
to acknowledge that, how could judges trust them to recognize the 
subtle difference between judicial and advisory opinions? Mansfield 
himself got a taste of this in 1772, when the lawyer Charles Fearne 
accused him of giving an opinion when he was solicitor general that 
contradicted his later opinion on the bench.287 This did not bode well for 
any judge who hoped to rethink an advisory opinion. 
The second concern was that readers might distort the law by 
imputing excessive authority to advisory opinions. During Impey's 
impeachment, a dispute arose about the admissibility of evidence. Sir 
Lloyd Kenyon, the Master of the Rolls, told the House of Commons that 
"the Judges were ready to give their opinion" as needed: "Upon all 
disputed points the law would be pronounced from the Woolsack" (the 
Lord Chancellor's seat), "and what was so pronounced must be 
considered as law."288 Edmund Burke balked at that description of 
judicial authority, and he warned that Kenyon "held too high an opinion 
of the determination of the Judges."289 Burke told the chamber that he 
"had contended, and with success, against the unanimous opinion of the 
284. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to the Duke of Bedford (May 23, 1767), Add. Ms. 32982, 
at 99-100 (on file with the British Library). 
285. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Mansfield (May 24, 1767), Add. Ms. 32982, at 
111 (on file with the British Library). 
286. See, e.g., Debate in the Commons on the Resolutions for Restraining the East India 
Company's Dividends: Statement of Speaker Fletcher Norton (Mar. 23, 1773), in 17 
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 73, at 813, 824 (''Respecting the opinion I formerly gave upon 
the subject, being not then in office, it may be supposed a transcript of my real sentiments."). 
287. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Relevance of Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council, in TEXTS AND 
CONTEXTS IN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CHARLES DONAHUE 413, 425 (John Witte, Jr., 
Sara McDougall & Anna Di Robilant eds., 2016). The allegation was serious enough that Mansfield 
felt compelled to deny it from the bench. See Hodgson v. Ambrose (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 216, 220; 1 
Dougl. 337, 343-44. The incident remained fodder for lawyerly gossip more than seventy years 
later. JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 356 (2004). 
288. Proceedings on the Impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey: Statement of Sir Lloyd Kenyon, 
Master of the Rolls (Feb. 7, 1788), in 26 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 73, at 1340, 1424. 
289. Proceedings on the Impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey: Statement of Edmund Burke (Feb. 
7, 1788), in 26 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 73, at 1340, 1424. 
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Judges," which was worthy of respect but not infallible.290 Although 
Kenyon was the front-runner to succeed Mansfield as Lord Chief 
Justice, Burke hoped that he might wait "some time longer" before 
getting promoted-"as it were, performing quarantine," so that 
he would not infect the bench with his diseased notions of 
judicial supremacy.29i 
The exchange illustrated the ambiguities of contemporary 
jurisprudence. Neither Kenyon nor Burke believed that judges could 
make new law, particularly through extrajudicial declarations. 292 But 
they nonetheless disagreed about the evidentiary value of judges' 
opinions. As a result, judges could not be sure whether their 
extrajudicial pronouncements would be "considered as law," as Kenyon 
put it, or as contestable evidence of the law. 293 This exchange wasn't an 
isolated occurrence. In Entick v. Carrington (1765), Lord Camden had 
felt compelled to remind his listeners that "the Opinion of all the 12 
Judges of England" could not "extrajudicially make a Law to bind 
the Kingdom."294 
Impey himself had articulated this concern while he was still in 
India. Although he resisted giving advisory opinions to executive 
officials in Bengal, he and his colleagues were more willing to advise 
courts from other British settlements in India, which were not within 
the SCJ's appellate jurisdiction. When giving that advice, Impey 
warned that his "opinion must be understood as not carrying any 
Authority with it from my station nor have any greater weight given to 
it than that of a Counsel in England on a Cause laid before him .... 
[A]ny advice we give must be understood private & not ex Officio."295 
Impey and his colleagues soon decided that those warnings were 
insufficient, and a short time later, they declined to speak even in their 
private capacities. "[I]f more weight were given to [our letter] than a 
private Opinion deserves," the judges explained, "it might create 
Mischiefs that we forsee [sic] and many that can not possibly be 
290. Id. 
291. Id. Kenyon became Lord Chief Justice a few months later. 
292. See, e.g., Good v. Elliott (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 808, 815; 3 Term. Rep. 693, 706 
(Kenyon, C.J.). 
293. Proceedings on the Impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey: Statement of Edmund Burke (Feb. 
7, 1788), in 26 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 73, at 1424. 
294. Arvind & Burset, supra note 267, at 62 (quoting a manuscript report of the case). 
295. Letter from Elijah lmpey to John Turing (Oct. 4, 1776), Add. Ms. 16265, at 129v-13lv (on 
file with the British Library); see also Letter from Elijah Impey to Andrew Ross (Oct. 11, 1776), 
Add. Ms. 16266, at 26v (on file with the British Library) (asking that his opinion ''be only 
considered as the private opinion of a private Barrister"). 
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foreseen."296 In the increasingly vitriolic politics of British India, no 
caveat could be strong enough to prevent misuse. 
Later events justified that caution. Recall the judges' opinion 
about whether Warren Hastings had resigned.297 Although the judges 
expressly denied that it had any intrinsic authority, Clavering and 
Francis nonetheless called it a "judgment," binding on them as parties 
even though they disputed its reasoning.298 When the judges sent the 
Council another letter a few days later to clarify their original 
opinion,299 the councilors replied that they "regard[ed] it as legal 
authority."300 Richard Barwell later testified to a parliamentary 
committee "that it would have been his duty" to follow the opinions of 
the judges, even if he had disagreed with their advice. 301 In other words, 
he, too, treated it as a judgment, despite the judges' insistence that it 
was no such thing. But Barwell wasn't even consistent in overvaluing 
advisory opinions. He told the same committee that he also felt bound 
to follow the advice of a Company-appointed lawyer, even when it 
conflicted with the judges' determinations. 302 More than four years after 
the fact, he still could not articulate a coherent theory of how seriously 
he ought to have taken the judges' words. 
American judges shared these concerns. Anxiety about the 
nature of legal authority was part of the new republic's inheritance.303 
As a result, American judges also inherited the growing discomfort with 
extrajudicial opinions. In 1787, for example, a Connecticut court 
warned justices of the peace "to be cautious in declaring extra-judicial 
296. Letter from the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature to the Governor-Gen. & Council (Oct. 19, 
1776), Add. Ms. 16266, at 3lr-3lv (on file with the British Library). The justices later resumed 
their private advice-giving, once colonial politics cooled down and it seemed that their letters would 
"not be productive of mischief." JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature to the Governor-Gen. & Council, 
Copy of Parts of a Letter from the Judges to the Governour General and Council of Fort William 
Containing Their Answers to the Questions Proposed by the President and Council of Fort St. 
George (Oct. 30, 1777), Add. Ms. 38400, at ll 7r (on file with the British Library). 
297. Supra notes 173-177 and accompanying text. 
298. Minute from John Clavering & Philip Francis (June 23, 1777), in 12 BENGAL: PAST & 
PRESENT, supra note 17 4, at 18, 18. 
299. Letter from the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature to the Governor-Gen. & Council (June 
24, 1777), in 12 BENGAL: PAST & PRESENT, supra note 174, at 26, 26. 
300. Letter from Warren Hastings & Richard Barwell to the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature 
(June 24, 1777), in 12 BENGAL: PAST & PRESENT, supra note 174, at 27, 27. 
301. REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE ON PETITIONS RELATIVE TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE IN INDIA (May 8, 1781), reprinted in REPORTS, supra note 154, at 1, 28. 
302. Id. at 28-29. 
303. See, e.g., Kempin, supra note 60, at 37-38; Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Article Ill's 
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
447, 476 & n.145 (1994) (arguing that stare decisis might not have been established in the United 
States until the nineteenth century). 
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opinions, lest an undue use should be made of them."304 The judges of 
most other states seem to have shared this concern. 305 
American judges also feared their old opinions might be used to 
embarrass them. Consider the events leading up to Hayburn's Case.306 
In 1 792, the judges of three circuit courts wrote to President 
Washington about legislation that instructed them to review veterans' 
pension claims. In one such letter, Justice Iredell and Judge John 
Sitgreaves emphasized "the necessity of judges being in general 
extremely cautious in not intimating an opinion in any case extra-
judicially."307 In part, they were worried that doing so might bias them 
in future litigation. But they also feared embarrassment if they changed 
their minds. 308 "[I]f we can be convinced this opinion is a wrong one, we 
shall not hesitate to act accordingly," they insisted; "being as far from 
the weakness of supposing that there is any reproach in having 
committed an error, to which the greatest and best men are sometimes 
liable."309 This was a preemptive defense against the criticism they 
might receive for appearing to flip-flop. In the politically charged 
landscape of the 179Os-a time when the structure and role of the 
federal judiciary were deeply contested310-judges simply lacked 
confidence that their extrajudicial writings would be read in the 
proper spirit. 311 
304. Wilson v. Hinkley, 1 Kirby 199, 201 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1787) (per curiam). 
305. See Letter from Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, Governor, New York (Mar. 21, 1801), 
supra note 224, at 482 (noting Chancellor Livingston's position). There were limited exceptions in 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. &e infra Appendix. 
306. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
307. Letter from James Iredell & John Sitgreaves to George Washington (June 8, 1792), 
reprinted in Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 413 n.*. 
308. Later judges were sometimes more explicit about their fear of humiliation. See, e.g., In re 
Advisory Opinion, 169 S.E.2d 697, 700 (N.C. 1969) ("Otherwise, as justices ... we may find 
ourselves embarrassed by an advisory opinion given without the benefit of argument and briefs."); 
In re Requests to Judges in Chancery for Advisory Opinions, 137 A. 151, 151 (N.J. Ch. 1927) 
(warning that an advisory opinion "may embarrass [a judge] immensely when the matter comes 
before him officially''). 
309. Letter from James Iredell & John Sitgreaves to George Washington (June 8, 1792), supra 
note 307. 
310. See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOWGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 186 (2010) 
(discussing reservations about the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
311. Focusing on the potential misuse of advisory opinions also explains why some kinds of 
extrajudicial activity disappeared while others survived. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying 
text. For example, because private advice was unlikely to circulate widely, it had less risk of being 
misinterpreted by the public. Advice that judges gave to another court or in a quasi-appellate 
capacity was also less likely to be misinterpreted, because in both situations, the advice would 
eventually be linked to a judgment. Cf. A[rchibald] Macdonald, Opinion of the Attorney General 
(Oct. 22, 1792), in 1 MCARTHUR, supra note 26, at 430, 432 (describing the capacity of judges to 
"solemnly settle[]" the legality of court-martial verdicts). 
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It's unsurprising that the Justices didn't mention these concerns 
in the Correspondence itself. Their letter instead emphasized their right 
to say no, 312 while also invoking the classical concern with prejudging 
cases. 313 This was sufficient to justify their refusal, so there was no need 
to add the more insulting argument that the president or the American 
people could not be trusted to read an advisory opinion correctly. 
Besides, if the Justices' fundamental fear was that their writings might 
be misread, they had every reason to keep their letter as short 
as possible. 
C. How the Correspondence Was Canonized 
The Justices of 1793 meant to discourage the Washington 
Administration from seeking advisory opinions, but they did not declare 
them unconstitutional. How, then, was the Correspondence 
transformed into a constitutional landmark? 
First, let's consider why the executive branch didn't keep asking 
for the Justices' advice. The main reason was logistical: the early 
Justices were in the capital for only a few weeks each year. 314 The 
Justices had made it clear that, like English judges, they wouldn't give 
opm10ns without an opportunity for in-person discussion. 315 
Furthermore, to the extent that the Administration hoped to use 
opinions for political cover, their value would have been diminished 
without a full set of signatures. As a result, judicial advice would 
usually have taken weeks to obtain---even if the Justices had wanted to 
give it. 
The practical difficulties increased in 1794, when the President 
sent the Chief Justice to London to negotiate what became known as 
the Jay Treaty. By the time he returned to the United States in 1795, 
he had been elected Governor of New York. Jay's successor, John 
Rutledge, denounced the Jay Treaty shortly after his nomination; his 
ill-advised speech led the Senate to reject his nomination and some 
observers to question his sanity. 316 This was not someone whose opinion 
President Washington was likely to solicit. The next Chief Justice, 
Oliver Ellsworth, was more sound; but in 1799, he left on a mission to 
312. See supra notes 201-209 and accompanying text. 
313. This is what the judges seem to have meant when they said they were judges of a "court 
in the last resort." See Wheeler, supra note 184, at 152. Professor Casto suggests that this phrase 
was meant to reinforce the Justices' right to refuse by drawing an analogy to the House of Lords, 
which did not issue advisory opinions. Casto, supra note 52, at 188-89. 
314. See JAY, supra note 38, at 98-99; White, supra note 24, at 6-7. 
315. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
316. See supra note 214. 
672 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3:621 
France.317 Chief Justice Marshall, appointed in 1801, had the virtue of 
remaining in the country; but his advice would have been uncongenial 
to President Jefferson, his longtime antagonist, or to President 
Madison, who thought that the Marshall Court already had too many 
chances to say what the law is. 318 President Monroe, elected in 1816, 
was more interested in the Court's views. 319 But by then, the presidency 
had functioned for nearly three decades without advisory opinions. 
This was possible thanks to the advice-giving role of the attorney 
general. As the Justices emphasized, the Constitution authorized the 
president to require opinions from the heads of executive departments; 
and the Judiciary Act of 1789 directed the attorney general "to give his 
advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the 
President of the United States, or when requested by the heads of any 
of the departments."320 The first attorneys general had little prestige 
and no supervisory authority-not even over U.S. Attorneys321-and 
early occupants of the office seem to have viewed opinion-giving as a 
rare chance to be useful. 322 Like their English counterparts, American 
attorneys general believed that their oaths obliged them to faithfully 
expound the law-just like judges. 323 Indeed, Attorney General William 
Wirt described himself "as a judge, called to decide a question of law 
317. See supra note 214. 
318. See R. KENT NEWMYER, THE TREASON TRIAL OF AARON BURR: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE 
CHARACTER WARS OF THE NEW NATION 46-47 (2012) (discussing Jefferson and Marshall's "intense 
dislike and distrust of one another"); Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), 
in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 500-04 (David B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg, Mary Parke Johnson 
& Anne Mandeville Colony eds., 2009) (Madison discussing his displeasure with the Court's 
"latitudinary mode of expounding the Constitution" in Marbury v. Madison). 
319. David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 85-88 
(2015). In 1822, President Monroe sent the Justices a pamphlet he had written about internal 
improvements. Id. at 85. Three Justices replied; but although two of the letters offered some legal 
commentary, the Court as a whole did not offer an advisory opinion. Id. at 85-88. Justice Johnson's 
letter purported to speak for the full Court; but, as Professor Schwartz shows, that wasn't accurate. 
Id. at 85-86. Justice Story expressly declined "to express any opinion." Id. at 85. Accordingly, the 
Justices' replies were in the nature of private advice, not advisory opinions. 
320. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93. 
321. Edmund Randolph was paid less than the other members of the Cabinet; he didn't have 
his own office; and he couldn't persuade Congress to pay for a single clerk. Jed Handelsman 
Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights 
or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 131 (2014). 
322. When Jefferson learned of the Justices' refusal, he asked Randolph "if we could not 
prepare a bill for Congress to appoint a board or some other body of advice for the Executive on 
such questions." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 11, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 220, at 651, 653. Randolph replied that "he should 
propose to annex it to his office." Id. 
323. HAMBURGER, supra note 49, at 320-21; Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of 
Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1471 (2010). 
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with the impartiality and integrity which characterizes the judician."324 
Such a perspective allowed holders of that office to become increasingly 
effective substitutes for judicial advisors. 325 Analogous developments 
facilitated the demise of advisory opinions in England326 and Bengal.327 
Meanwhile, the prevailing understanding of the Justices' actions 
in 1 793 had evolved. Initially, observers did not see the Correspondence 
as announcing a constitutional principle. On receiving the Justices' 
letter, Jefferson observed only that "they declined being consulted," and 
that English admiralty judges showed no such reluctance.328 A decade 
later, however, Chief Justice Marshall offered a different gloss. In his 
biography of George Washington, he described the Correspondence as 
reflecting the Justices' view that the Court was only "a legal tribunal 
for the decision of controversies brought before them in legal form," and 
that it would be "improper to enter the field of politics, by declaring 
their opinions on questions not growing out of the case before them."329 
Marshall apparently hadn't seen the Justices' letter, 330 and it's not clear 
how he arrived at his interpretation.331 But it quickly became canonical. 
Thomas Sergeant, a former justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
adopted Marshall's explanation nearly verbatim in his treatise on 
324. Shugerman, supra note 321, at 133 (quoting Letter from William Wirt to John C. Calhoun 
(Feb. 3, 1820)). 
325. See DAVID R. DEENER, THE UNITED STATES A'ITORNEYS GENERAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 22-24 (1957). 
326. The attorney and solicitor general gradually gained prestige during the eighteenth 
century. EDWARDS, supra note 218, at 279-80. By the end of the century, they remained servants 
of the Crown, but they were no longer seen as totally subservient. &e Oldham, supra note 77, at 
172-73; see also GORDON H. WARREN, FOUNTAIN OF DISCONTENT: THE TRENT AFFAIR AND 
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 99 (1981) (suggesting that the prime minister rightly relied "on the written 
opinion of the law officers," rather than the oral advice of the Lord Chancellor and an admiralty 
judge, concerning a question of international law during the 1860s). 
327. In 1776, the East India Company appointed Sir John Day as the first advocate general of 
Bengal. J. Duncan M. Derrett, Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience, in CHANGING LAW IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 114, 134 (J.N.D. Anderson ed., 1963). Although he had been appointed 
partly to represent the Council before the SCJ, his practice consisted mostly of rendering legal 
opinions. JOHN DAY, STATE OF SIR JOHN DAY'S CLAIM UPON THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY 2 
(London, 1787). 
328. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 11, 1793), supra note 322. 
329. 5 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 441 (Philadelphia, C.P. 
Wayne 1804). 
330. He didn't quote the Correspondence, and he seemed to be guessing about its date. 
Specifically, he was unsure whether it had been received when the Cabinet met on August 3. Id. 
at 441-42. (The letter is dated August 8.) The Correspondence was only printed in 1891. Wheeler, 
supra note 184, at 145 n.98. 
331. Professor Steilen has argued that a new understanding of judging emerged in the 1790s, 
which emphasized courts' unique authority to expound laws through the nonpolitical process of 
litigation. Matthew Steilen, Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the Founding, 17 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 479, 561-67 (2014). Under this paradigm, various kinds of extrajudicial commentary, 
including politicized grand jury charges and advisory opinions, came to seem at odds with judicial 
office. Id. Marshall's retelling of the Correspondence sounded similar themes. 
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constitutional law. 332 Justice Story, in turn, relied on Sergeant's 
treatise, in addition to Marshall's biography, when making his own 
pronouncement in 1833 that federal judges "cannot ... be called upon 
to advise the president in any executive measures; or to give 
extrajudicial interpretations oflaw."333 Marshall's account, amplified by 
Story's treatise, became the basis of the standard view offederaljudicial 
power in the early twentieth century. 334 Reformers continued 
occasionally to call for a revival of advisory opinions, but at that point, 
they were arguing for a practice that had been disfavored for more than 
a century.335 
CONCLUSION 
The Jay Court's famous refusal of 1793 was a pragmatic 
response to growing anxiety about the nature of legal authority, not a 
declaration that the Constitution barred advisory opinions. This 
historical discovery has far-reaching implications. As Dean Erwin 
Chemerinsky has observed, "justiciability doctrines exist largely to 
ensure that federal courts will not issue advisory opinions."336 One 
might ask whether those doctrines need a new purpose. 
Answering that question is work for another day, but it might be 
helpful to suggest some points of departure. As an initial matter, this 
Article does not argue that federal courts should get into the advice 
business. Federal judges never had a duty to give advisory opinions; 
and their long practice to the contrary has created a strong norm-and 
perhaps even a constitutional rule-against starting now. 337 Moreover, 
332. THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BEING A VIEW OF THE PRACTICE AND 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND OF CONSTITUTIONAL POINTS DECIDED 
375 (Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 2d ed. 1830) (1822). 
333. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 651 
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). Story's constitutional interpretation aligned with his broader 
views about the proper role of the judiciary: in 1820, he led an effort to amend the Massachusetts 
Constitution so as to eliminate its provision authorizing advisory opinions. JOURNAL OF DEBATES 
AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES CHOSEN TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF 
MAsSACHUSETTS 72 (Boston, The Daily Advertiser 1821); TOPF, supra note 18, at 35--36. 
334. See United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 301 (1909) (quoting Marshall and citing Story); 
see also Wheeler, supra note 184, at 145 (describing the adoption of Story's account). Alexis de 
Tocqueville further amplified Story's perspective when he used the Commentaries as one of the 
principal sources for his account of the American judiciary. See ANDRE JARDIN, TOCQUEVILLE: A 
BIOGRAPHY 201-03 (Lydia Davis & Robert Hemenway trans., 1989) (describing Tocqueville's 
reliance on Story); 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 169-75 (Eduardo Nolla ed., 
James T. Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund 2012) (1840). The first Supreme Court opinion to rely 
directly on the Correspondence was Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
335. See infra Appendix. 
336. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 54 (7th ed. 2016). 
337. See supra note 15. 
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the practical concerns that motivated the Jay Court persist. One might 
think, in our more positivist legal culture, that it would be simple 
enough for a court (or legislature) to make advisory opinions safe by 
declaring them nonbinding. But the effort would almost certainly fail. 338 
Consider, for example, the debate about the precedential authority of 
unpublished opinions. 339 Indeed, we still can't agree about the binding 
scope of judicial decisions. 340 Anxiety about legal authority still lurks, 
even if it's sometimes out of sight. 341 
To some extent, then, the status quo should persist, but on a new 
conceptual footing. In fact, one advantage of this Article's historical 
argument is that we can make sense of practices that now seem 
doctrinally dubious but practically irradicable. Consider the perennial 
debate about whether federal courts ought to focus primarily on "law 
declaration" or "dispute resolution."342 In practice, of course, they do 
both; but the Supreme Court has tended in recent years to privilege the 
former. 343 Regardless of whether that's desirable, it creates a conceptual 
problem. As several scholars have argued, a focus on law declaration 
fits uneasily with the justiciability doctrines of standing, ripeness, and 
mootness, which "rest on a dispute resolution model of adjudication."344 
But this apparent tension is less troubling once we recover the Court's 
historical reasons for avoiding extrajudicial advice. Their refusal to give 
an advisory opinion-the decision that was the mother of all 
justiciability doctrines-was itself a product of their desire to declare 
338. See CARISSIMA MATHEN, COURTS WITHOUT CASES: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF ADVISORY 
OPINIONS 213-21 (2019) (describing Canadian courts' failure to distinguish between references 
and ordinary cases); THAYER, supra note 211, at 58-59 (lamenting "a popular impression that 
[advisory opinions in Massachusetts] are on the same footing as decisions in litigated cases"). 
339. See, e.g., Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 116 MICH. L. REV. 705, 723 
(2018); Andrea Pin & Francesca M. Genova, The Duty to Disclose Adverse Precedents: The Spirit 
of the Common Law and Its Enemies, 44 YALE J. INT'L L. 239, 261 & n.141 (2019); Norman R. 
Williams, The Failings of Originalism: The Federal Courts and the Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 761, 776--77 (2004). 
340. See, e.g., RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 70--91 
(2017); Adam N. Steinman, Case Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 194 7 (2017); Charles W. Tyler, The 
Adjudicative Model of Precedent, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1551 (2020); Nina Varsava, Precedent on 
Precedent, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 118 (2020). 
341. Cf. Simpson, supra note 52, at 87 ("[W]hat is the authoritarian pecking order between a 
decision of the American Supreme Court, dicta by the late Scrutton L.J., and an article by Pollock? 
There are no rules to deal with conundrums of this sort."); Robert C. Berring, Legal Information 
and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1673, 1688-91 (2000) (arguing that the 
fragmentation of legal authority in the late twentieth century contributed to the growing number 
of split Supreme Court decisions). 
342. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related 
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665 (2012). 
343. Id. 
344. Pushaw, supra note 303, at 453; accord Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 1191, 1222 (2011). 
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the law more effectively. From that perspective, it becomes clear that 
justiciability is about protecting law declaration, not just ensuring that 
courts remain focused on resolving concrete disputes. 
In one sense, the connection between justiciability and law 
declaration is well known. Indeed, the Supreme Court has described the 
utility of adversarial presentation as one of the chief arguments against 
advisory opinions today.345 But that wasn't what motivated the Jay 
Court. As Part II showed, classical common-law judges had also 
emphasized the benefits of adversarialism, and yet they continued to 
give advisory opinions without it. What really pushed the Justices into 
silence was their desire to avoid statements that might later distort the 
law. That decision depended not on their perception of limited power 
under Article III but on a prudential judgment about what their judicial 
duty required. If that's right, then it might be productive to revisit older 
notions of justiciability, which saw the doctrine as a prudential tool 
rather than an inexorable constitutional command. 346 
In some cases, such an approach might actually lead judges to 
speak less-for example, by forgoing dicta that readers might be 
tempted to take too seriously. 347 The law now treats dicta as a kind of 
loophole to the rule against advisory opinions; a more historically 
grounded approach would allow us to think more forthrightly about the 
similar kinds of problems they raise. 348 At the same time, a more 
historically sensitive approach might sometimes free judges from the 
contortions required by an artificial avoidance of advisory opinions. 349 
This Article also makes a methodological intervention. Inquiries 
into the original meaning of the Constitution, whether by self-described 
originalists or otherwise, tend to draw a straight line from England to 
345. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 72, at 1360 ("[T]he Supreme Court has treated decisions 
rendered without full adversarial briefing as entitled to less precedential weight than decisions 
rendered on fully developed records.'). 
346. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 471-72 (2008) 
(describing this older notion of standing). 
347. Cf. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1249 (2006) (worrying that judges and lawyers too readily treat dicta as binding law). 
348. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2006 (1994); Lee, 
supra note 17, at 648-49; Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 4 7 STAN. L. REV. 633, 654-56 (1995). 
349. I tentatively suggest two possible applications. First, some scholars have suggested that 
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance has been distorted by the perceived need to prevent courts 
from issuing advisory opinions. See, e.g., Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation 
and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1275, 1283-85 (2016); William K. Kelley, Avoiding 
Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 840-81 (2001). 
Second, this Article suggests that courts in qualified-immunity cases need not worry that decisions 
on the constitutional merits are prohibited by Article III. See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. 
Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2015) (discussing this concern). 
Of course, constitutionality is not the only concern, and prudential considerations might lead 
courts to maintain their current practice. 
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the early republic. 350 To capture the Founders' legal worldview, courts 
and commentators typically look to canonical English texts like 
Blackstone's Commentaries or the practice of the Westminster courts, 
and perhaps adding evidence from early American treatises or case 
reports. This move is sometimes justifiable. For instance, the early 
Supreme Court deliberately modeled its procedures on "the practice of 
the courts of King's Bench and Chancery in England." 351 It makes sense, 
then, to examine those English courts to illuminate some aspects of 
early federal procedure.352 
In general, however, American lawyers saw themselves as 
inheriting not the practice of specific courts but the common law itself-
a law that wasn't tied to any particular jurisdiction.353 If what we're 
after is the eighteenth-century common law, then we should seek it 
wherever it was administered, including British colonies that did not 
become part of the United States. Of course, English materials will 
often be the easiest ones to access; and there might be doctrinal reasons 
to prefer the products of Westminster courts. But for some topics-such 
as the behavior of a newly created supreme court-the study of colonial 
legal materials offers an incomparable opportunity to understand the 
nature of judging in the eighteenth century . 
.APPENDIX: EXTRAJUDICIAL STRAGGLERS 
This Article has followed conventional wisdom in assuming that 
English judges gave their last advisory opinion to the Crown in 1760. 354 
350. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2011) (summarizing and critiquing this view). Professors Pfander and Birk 
have sought to broaden our perspective in a different way by emphasizing Scottish influences on 
the Founders' conception of judicial power. For other discussions of the importance of Scots law 
and legal theory, see LACROIX, supra note 310, at 24-29, 87-88, 120-24; William Ewald, James 
Wilson and the Scottish Enlightenment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1053, 1097-98 (2010); and James 
E. Pfander, Standing To Sue: Lessons from Scotland's Actio Popularis, 66 DUKE L.J. 1493 (2017). 
351. Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410 (1792). 
352. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 303, at 473 (examining English practice to consider the 
definition of a "case"). Even early federal practice, however, sometimes looked not to specific 
English courts but to broader concepts, such as "the principles, rules and usages which belong to 
courts of equity and to courts of admiralty." Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The 
Original Source of the Cause of Action in Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 
101 VA. L. REV. 609, 653 (2015) (quoting Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 
(repealed 1872)). 
353. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 52, at 937 & n.49 ("As Chancellor Taylor observed, ... 'it was 
the common law we adopted, and not English decisions.'''); Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 
95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1262-63 (2017). 
354. The reporter of Sackville's Case, a lawyer and member of Parliament named Robert 
Henley Eden, described it in 1818 as "the last time that the crown has taken the opinion of the 
judges extrajudicially." Sackville's Case (1760) 28 Eng. Rep. 940, 941; 2 Eden 371, 372 n. Later 
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But reporting was irregular, and it's possible that later specimens 
exist.355 If one is found, what would that mean for this Article? 
Not much. Its claim is merely that English judges tried to end 
their advisory practice after 1760. That historians have assumed for 
more than two centuries that advisory opinions ceased after that date 
is good evidence that the practice at least became less frequent. But it 
wouldn't be surprising if judges continued to issue stray advisory 
opinions in later years. Well into the nineteenth century, judges 
continued to swear an oath to advise the king. 356 If the Crown really 
wanted an advisory opinion, it could get one. 357 
For the sake of building a complete historical record, this 
Appendix considers an extrajudicial opinion that English judges gave 
in 1785, which has so far escaped the attention of legal historians. The 
matter began when Major General Charles Ross wrote a letter to a 
London newspaper in which he attacked his former commander.358 
George III and his cabinet agreed that Ross ought to be court-martialed 
"for his having published a letter so derogatory to the honour of a 
superior officer."359 A court-martial duly assembled on March 3, at 
which point its members raised doubts about their jurisdiction. Ross 
was on ''half-pay"-basically, in semiretirement-and it was unclear 
whether half-pay officers were subject to military law.360 Accordingly, 
the court-martial adjourned to get the judges' opinion. 361 The judges 
were away on circuit; but on April 26, after they had returned, they 
stated that neither Ross's warrant as a general officer nor his 
half-pay pension subjected him to military law.362 The court-martial 
accordingly dissolved. 
So far, this looks a lot like Sackville's Case: an opinion from the 
twelve judges about the jurisdiction of a court-martial, rendered at the 
scholars have accepted this statement. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 49, at 508 n.2; Thayer, 
supra note 211, at 46. 
355. See JAY, supra note 38, at 149 n.120. 
356. See OATH OF THE JUSTICES (1346), supra note 48. 
357. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Dundas, Home Sec'y, to Lord Loughborough, C.J. of Common 
Pleas (Sept. 12, 1792), supra note 21 (suggesting that the Crown had a "right to call for your 
sentiments" upon a "formal Reference to the Judges"). 
358. Charles Ross, For the Morning Herald, MORNING HERALD, Feb. 1, 1785, at 4, Gale, Doc. 
No. GALEIZ2000919121. 
359. Letter from George III to Lord Sydney (Feb. 2, 1760), in 1 THE LATER CORRESPONDENCE 
OF GEORGE III 130 (A. Aspinall ed., 1962). 
360. England, 4 7 SCOTS MAG., June 1785, at 303, 303. Some sources give the date as March 6. 
E.g., Historical Chronicle for March, UNIVERSAL MAG. KNOWLEDGE & PLEASURE, March 1785, at 
161, 162. 
361. Court Martial, WHITEHALL EVENING POST, Mar. 5, 1785, at 3, Gale, Doc. 
No. GALEIZ200169985. 
362. Monthly Chronology, 4 LoNDON MAG., May 1785, at 386, 386. 
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outset of the proceeding. That's mostly how it was reported in the 
contemporary press,363 in parliamentary debates, 364 and in nineteenth-
century treatises.365 But there are two reasons to hesitate before 
revising the death-date of advisory opinions. First, it's unclear what the 
judges said. Their opinion was never printed, and at least one 
contemporary-Prime Minister William Pitt-disagreed with those 
other accounts. During a parliamentary debate, he invoked a reference 
made to three judges (not twelve), who disagreed about the court-
martial's jurisdiction (rather than agreeing unanimously). 366 It's 
possible that he had in mind a different opinion, or that he was simply 
mistaken. In any event, the ambiguity suggests that the opinion was 
not widely available-and, perhaps, that it hadn't been written down 
at all. In other words, it's possible that the judges only gave an 
oral opinion. 
Second, unlike in Sackville's Case, members of Ross's court-
martial seem to have contacted the judges directly, rather than going 
through the King.367 Accordingly, the judges might have viewed the 
request as coming from another court. As the Introduction explained, 
judges treated those sorts of certified questions differently from advice 
to the Crown. 368 Accordingly, we can't say definitively that English 
judges gave an advisory opinion to the Crown after 1760-although it 
wouldn't be very surprising if they had done so. 
It's similarly unsurprising that advisory opinions survived in a 
few states in the late eighteenth century.369 In Massachusetts, the 
constitution adopted in 1780 authorized the legislative and executive 
branches "to require the opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial 
court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions."370 
Surviving sources shed little light on why the provision was included. 371 
363. See, e.g., Chronicle, in ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLITICS, AND 
LITERATURE, FOR THE YEARS 1784 AND 1785, at 222, 230-31 (J. Dodsley ed., 1786). 
364. See, e.g., 20 PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 18 (Mar. 21, 1786) (statement of Viscount 
Stormont). Some commentators didn't specify the number of judges but stated that their opinion 
was unanimous. See, e.g., id. at 20 (statement of Lord Loughborough). Loughborough, the chief 
justice of Common Pleas, had been one of the judges to join the opinion. 
365. See, e.g., DELAFONS, supra note 26, at 63; 1 McARTHUR, supra note 26, at 195-96; see also 
A Case of Hardship, 77 LANCET 617, 618 (1861) (referring to "the decision of the twelve judges in 
the case of General Ross''). 
366. 19 PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 381 (Mar. 16, 1786) (statement of William Pitt). 
367. See Principal Occurrences, in The NEW ANNUAL REGISTER, OR GENERAL REPOSITORY OF 
HISTORY, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE, FOR THE YEAR 1785, at 3, 20 (London, G.G.J. & J. Robinson 
1786) (reporting correspondence between the members of the court-martial and the Chief Baron 
of the Exchequer). 
368. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
369. See JAY, supra note 38, at 54-56. 
370. MAss. CONST. of 1780, ch. 3, art. 2, amended by MAss. CONST. art. 75. 
371. TOPF, supra note 18, at 8-12. 
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It's possible that its author, John Adams, 372 had in mind his own 
experience during the Stamp Act crisis, when he found it politically 
useful to pressure colonial judges for an opinion. 373 New Hampshire 
copied the Massachusetts provision in 1784.374 These provisions were 
rarely used.375 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was more active in 
giving advisory opinions during the 1780s, but the practice there seems 
to have depended largely on the leadership of Chief Justice Thomas 
McKean, and it died out after the state adopted a new constitution 
in 1790.376 
Attitudes toward advisory opinions continued to change during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; the 1820s and 1920s seem to 
have been times of especially vigorous debate. On the one hand, there 
were efforts to revive or expand the practice in various British and 
American jurisdictions. 377 On the other hand, critics of advisory 
opm10ns developed new arguments against them. 378 Those 
developments lie beyond the scope of this Article, but they merit 
investigation in future work. 
372. The Report of a Constitution or Form of Government for the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, Boston, 1779, 8 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS: MARCH 1 779- FEBRUARY 1 780, supra note 
183, at 232, 257 n.124. 
373. See supra note 183. 
374. TOPF, supra note 18, at 17-18. 
375. Id. at 29. 
376. JOHN M. COLEMAN, THOMAS MCKEAN: FORGOTTEN LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION 224-26 
(1975); ALBERT RUSSELL ELLINGWOOD, DEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT 64-
65 (1918); John M. Coleman, Thomas McKean and the Origin of an Independent Judiciary, 34 PA. 
HIST. 111, 125 (1967). In 1807, when McKean was governor, the legislature directed the justices 
to prepare a report about "which of the English statutes are in force in this Commonwealth, and 
which of those statutes in their opinion ought to be incorporated into" Pennsylvania statutory law. 
An Act Enjoining Certain Duties on the Judges of the Supreme Court, 3 Binney 594 (1807). The 
judges complied; but their work product looks more like a research report than an advisory opinion. 
See REPORT OF THE JUDGES, in 3 REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 595, 595-98 (Horace Binney ed., 1808). 
377. See, e.g., D.B. Swinfen, Politics and the Privy Council: Special Reference to the Judicial 
Committee, 23 JURID. REV. (N.S.) 126 (1978). 
378. See, e.g., TOPF, supra note 18, at 29-39 (highlighting arguments that advisory opinions 
encourage political abuse); Note, The Advisory Opinion and the United States Supreme Court, 5 
FORDHAM L. REV. 94, 94-95 (1936) (discussing a proposed amendment to the Constitution that 
would have allowed for advisory opinions); supra note 333 and accompanying text (highlighting 
Joseph Story's opinion that it is improper for the judicial branch to act as an advisor to another 
branch of government). Compare Manley 0. Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and 
International Courts, 37 HARV. L. REV. 970 (1924) (arguing for the utility of advisory opinions), 
with Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 1008 (critiquing Hudson and describing advisory opinions as 
"ghosts that slay"). 
